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Abstract

This paper proposes a new framework to identify the effects of the minimum wage on the
joint distribution of sector and wages in a developing country. I show that under reasonable
assumptions, cross-sectional data on the worker's wage and sector can identify the joint
distribution of the latent counterparts of these variables; that is, the sector status and wage that
would prevail in the absence of the minimum wage. I apply the method in the “PNAD”, a
nationwide representative Brazilian cross-sectional dataset for the years 2001 to 2009. The
results indicate that the size of the informal sector is increased by around 39% compared to what
would prevail in the absence of the minimum wage, an effect attributable to (i) unemployment
effects of the minimum wage on the formal sector, (ii) movements of workers from the formal to
the informal sector as a response to the policy.
JEL No. J60, J30, J31
Keywords: Minimum wage, informality, unemployment, density discontinuity design, wage
inequality, labor tax revenues, formal sector
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1. INTRODUCTION
Despite its widespread use, controversy persists regarding the economic impact of
the minimum wage. A simple one-sector competitive market model predicts that a
minimum wage will generate unemployment when the minimum exceeds the marketclearing wage. However, if the employer has market power, then a minimum wage can
lead to an increase in wages and employment. In an economy with a large informal
sector, where some employers do not comply with the minimum wage policy, the minimum wage might not generate unemployment eﬀects even in the absence of market
power on the part of the employer. This will hold as long as the workers can freely
migrate from one sector to the other and the informal sector is suﬃciently large to
accommodate such movements.
These conﬂicting theoretical predictions provide a strong motivation for empirical
studies on the eﬀects of minimum wage policies. In this paper, I develop a Dualeconomy model based on Meyer and Wise (1983) to assess the impacts of the minimum
wage on (a) unemployment, (b) average wages, (c) wage inequality, (d) sector mobility,
(e) the size of the informal sector, and (f) labor tax revenues. I model the joint
distribution of wages and sectors (latent and observed), as opposed to the marginal
distribution of wages, as in Meyer and Wise (1983). A model for the joint distribution
of sector and wages allows me to infer the size of the formal sector that would prevail
in the absence of the minimum wage and compute the proportion of workers who
move to the informal sector in response to the policy. I provide the conditions for
identifying the Dual-economy model parameters and the latent joint distribution of
sector and wages, that is, the distribution that would prevail in the absence of the
minimum wage policy. My identiﬁcation strategy relies on the discontinuity in wage
density at the minimum wage and the diﬀerences in the response to the minimum
wage between the formal and informal sectors.
This paper’s contributions to the literature are the following: (i) I document key
empirical facts concerning the relationship between formal and informal wage distri-
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butions that have been overlooked in previous research, namely, the similarity between
these distributions conditional on values above the minimum wage; (ii) I provide a
novel identiﬁcation strategy that combines a non-parametric density discontinuity
design with a parametric model for the conditional probability of sector given the
wage. In particular, I show that under reasonable conditions, the parameters that
describe the eﬀects of the minimum wage and the underlying latent joint distribution
of sector and wages are identiﬁed using only cross-sectional data. (iii) I estimate a
sector mobility parameter, the probability that a worker in the formal sector moves
to the informal sector in response to the minimum wage; (iv) I demonstrate how to
test some of the assumptions invoked to identify the parameters of the model and
I show that these assumptions hold in the empirical application; (v) I estimate the
eﬀect of the minimum wage on the joint distribution of sector and wages and estimate
the eﬀect of the minimum wage on labor tax revenues. To the best of my knowledge,
this is the ﬁrst paper that attempts to identify both the latent share of the formal
sector and the eﬀects of the minimum wage on labor tax revenues.
The identiﬁcation problem studied in this paper includes minimum wage policies as
a special case. In general, any policy that introduces a boundary type of restriction
can potentially be analyzed under this framework. Examples of such policies are
price ﬂoors, price ceilings, and age restrictions (such as the restrictions for alcohol
and tobacco consumption). These policies will typically aﬀect the size of the market,
the distribution of quality of the good, taxes, and induce some transactions to occur
“oﬀ the table” (and by so increase the size of a “black” market). This paper provides
a set of assumptions and data requirements under which it is possible to identify the
eﬀects of such policies on these outcomes.
The model is estimated using the years 2001 to 2009 from “Pesquisa Nacional por
Amostra de Domicı́lios” (PNAD), a dataset comprising repeated cross sections of
an annual household survey that is representative of the Brazilian population. I ﬁnd
that the probability of a formal worker switching to the informal sector as a result of

3
the policy is small – approximately 12%. The combined eﬀect of unemployment and
transitions to the informal sector generated by the introduction of the minimum wage
leads to an 9% decrease in the size of the formal sector relative to the counterfactual
state deﬁned by the absence of the minimum wage. This associated growth in the
size of the informal sector as a result of the policy is 39% - an eﬀect attributable to
the fact that the latent formal sector is four times larger than the informal sector of
the economy. Unemployment eﬀects of the minimum wage are, as expected, highly
correlated with the real value of the minimum wage. Moreover, the minimum wage
strongly aﬀects average wages (promoting an increase of approximately 16%), wage
inequality (an approximately -19% eﬀect on the standard deviation of log wages and
a -24% impact on the Gini Index), and labor tax revenues (-6%).
2. BACKGROUND
In Brazil, all workers are required to carry a government document called a
“Carteira de Trabalho”, or worker’s card. This document, introduced in 1932, serves
as proof of the worker’s legal employment status. If a worker is formally employed
in the Brazilian labor market, then his contract is signed by the employer on a page
of the worker’s card. This labor contract implies that the worker’s employment is in
compliance with labor taxes and labor regulations such as the minimum wage. Formal
employment gives the worker access to beneﬁts that include unemployment insurance
and severance payments.
Not all labor contracts are signed by the employer and included in the worker’s
card. When an employer and a worker agree to a labor contract but decide not to
formally sign it and include it in the worker’s card, the worker’s employment is called
informal. Reasons for the existence of informal contracts include the evasion of labor
regulations, such as the payment of labor taxes, compliance with the minimum wage,
job safety standards, and restrictions on hours worked per week.1 This deﬁnition of
1

Firms face a trade-oﬀ between the costs of complying with the regulation and the probability/magnitude of punishment. The ﬁrms’ decision to hire formal versus informal workers was investigated in Almeida and Carneiro (2012), and Mattos and Ogura (2009).
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informality is tightly related to compliance with the minimum wage. However, these
concepts are not equivalent. A worker with a wage below the minimum wage level
is surely an informal worker. However, a worker whose wage is above the minimum
wage may be formal or informal depending on whether his contract is signed by the
employer.2 The proportion of private sector workers between the ages of 19 and 59
who are employed in the formal sector is .74. In other words, more than one quarter of
private sector workers do not have a signed contract included in their worker’s card.
The minimum wage in Brazil has been set at the federal level since 1984. In theory,
all jobs are covered, meaning that the (same) minimum wage level should apply to
every worker. In practice, coverage only extends to workers with a contract written
on the worker’s card (Lemos, 2009). A uniﬁed minimum wage set at the federal level
with full coverage complicates the task of ﬁnding an appropriate control group. This
is because cross-border diﬀerences-in-diﬀerences analysis, such as that in Card and
Krueger (1994), is ruled out as a practical option, as the same level prevails in all
states. Another feature of the minimum wage changes in Brazil is that since 2005,
they have been linked to inﬂation and GDP growth, which poses further challenges to
the use of time-series variation to estimate the eﬀects of the minimum wage. Under
these conditions, it is more diﬃcult to disentangle the eﬀects of the minimum wage
from other sources of changes in the wage distribution that are linked to changes in
economic activity.
Despite these challenges, it is nevertheless possible to identify the eﬀect of the minimum wage using only cross-sectional data on sector and wages. This paper describes
a set of a priori restrictions – on the joint distribution of sector and wage, and on
the eﬀects of the policy – that allows for identiﬁcation of the eﬀects of the minimum
wage using only cross-sectional data on sector and wages. This research design is well
suited to analyze markets characterized by the absence of cross-sectional or time series variation on the policy level that can be used for identiﬁcation, such as the case
2

As we will discuss in greater detail below, approximately 20% of the workers whose wages are
above the minimum are informal workers.
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of the minimum wage in the Brazilian labor market.3
The points of departure for this paper are the works of Meyer and Wise (1983) and
Doyle (2006). These papers show how to identify the eﬀects of the minimum wage
on the distribution of wages. I extend their model to a two-sector, or dual-economy,
setting with sector mobility. This allows wages in both sectors to be aﬀected, but in
diﬀerent ways, by the minimum wage. It also allows me to capture the eﬀects of the
minimum wage on the size of the formal sector and other related outcomes, such as
labor tax revenues.
The dual-economy extension I develop presents new challenges for identiﬁcation.
This is because the techniques presented in Doyle (2006) are not suﬃcient to recover
the sector-speciﬁc parameters of the model in this general version. The reason is that
applying Doyle’s strategy to the aggregate economy only recovers a weighted average
of the parameters, which will be uninformative for most of the outcomes of interest.
Applying his method to each sector separately is not feasible, as workers have moved
from one sector to the other as a result of the policy. Thus, one of the contributions
of this paper is demonstrating how to identify the eﬀects of the minimum wage in
this dual-economy setting.
In the next sections, I brieﬂy describe the models of Meyer and Wise (1983) and
Doyle (2006) to highlight the similarities and diﬀerences between their papers and
the approach followed here.
3. MODEL
The eﬀect of the minimum wage on a worker’s wage is the diﬀerence between his
wage under the policy and the wage he would receive in its absence. The fundamental
problem of causal evaluation is that this diﬀerence is conceptually well deﬁned but
3

The assumptions made to address the question of interest will not be in terms of agents’ preferences, technology or equilibrium mechanisms; rather, they will be in terms of the relationship between
latent and observed variables. In this sense, the identiﬁcation is semi-structural. It is structural in
the sense that it relies on assumptions concerning the eﬀects of the policy and semi-structural in
the sense that those assumptions can be satisﬁed by a wide set of diﬀerent fully speciﬁed structural
models.
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never observed in the data. This is true because we can at most observe the wages for
each worker in one of the two possible states of the world. However, it is nevertheless
helpful to consider these objects. Thus, let worker i be characterized by an observed
wage Wi (1) and a corresponding latent wage Wi (0), which is deﬁned as the wage
that the worker would receive in the absence of the minimum wage. I will denote the
minimum wage level by m. I will denote by F0 (w) (f0 (w)) the CDF (pdf) of latent
wages. Similarly, denote by F (w) (f (w)) the CDF (pdf) of observed wages. To keep
the model as simple as possible, assume that these workers come from a population
with similar observable characteristics, and hence, we do not need to control for
these characteristics. In the absence of the minimum wage, every worker i in this
population obtains a draw Wi (0) from the distribution F0 , which I will refer to as
the underlying wage distribution or the distribution of “market” wages. Although
workers are intrinsically homogeneous ex-ante, meaning that they draw their wages
from the same distribution, they will have diﬀerent wages ex-post.
In the presence of the minimum wage policy, the worker will receive a draw Wi (1)
from the distribution F , which I will refer to as the distribution of observed wages.4
To make the problem of identifying the eﬀects of the minimum wage tractable, I
follow Meyer and Wise by imposing a set of a priori restrictions on the distribution of
the latent variables and on the eﬀects of the policy.5 As we will see, these restrictions
allow me to identify the eﬀects of the policy without relying on exogenous policy
variations or time-series data.

4

The most ﬂexible way to model the eﬀects of the minimum wage in the wage distribution is to
assume that each worker can potentially be aﬀected by the policy. If we consider wages in terms of
a discrete variable, the eﬀects of the minimum wage on the distribution of wages can be completely
characterized by a matrix of transitions that govern the probability that a worker at any point
w of the latent wage distribution will end up at any point w0 in the observed wage distribution.
That is, a completely general (and, by construction, correctly speciﬁed) model for the eﬀects of the
minimum wage on the wage distribution is a transition matrix in which every entry is given by
P r[W (1) = w0 |W (0) = w].
5
I discuss in Section 6.4 and in Appendix D how to indirectly test the validity of these a priori
restrictions.
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3.1. The Meyer and Wise Approach
This section describes the assumptions and estimation strategy used by Meyer and
Wise (1983). Assume that the econometrician observes a random sample of observed
wages {Wi (1)} of size N from a population of interest.6 Let the following hold:
Assumption MW1

The latent wage is log-normally distributed. That is,

log(W (0)) ∼ N (µ, σ 2 ).
Assumption MW2

There are no spillovers from the minimum wage. This means

that W (1) = W (0) when W (0) > m.
Assumption MW3

If W (0) < m, then with probability πm , the worker receives the

minimum wage (W (1) = m). With probability πd , (W (1) = W (0)), the worker’s wage
is the same as the latent wage (non-compliance). With the complementary probability
πu = 1 − πm − πd , the worker becomes unemployed (W (1) = ·).7
The probabilities (πm , πd , πu ) represent the likelihood of receiving the minimum
wage, non-compliance and unemployment. These parameters arise so naturally in the
context of the minimum wage that it is occasionally diﬃcult to recognize how they
restrict the model in any way. They seem to resemble a list of all possible outcomes.
This is not the case, however. The restrictions imposed by deﬁning these probabilities
are as follows: (i) P r[W (1) > m|W (0) < m] = 0, that is, no worker whose market
wage is below the minimum wage will receive a wage greater than the minimum wage
when the policy is introduced; (ii) the probabilities πd , πm and πu are not a function
of the worker’s latent wage, such as, for example, a function of how far they are from
6

Note that this is a non-standard policy evaluation problem in which all individuals are treated
(Wi = Wi (1)), meaning that the (same) minimum wage level holds for everyone in the population.
The absence of a control group forces the use of a model to identify the eﬀects of the policy.
7
Strictly speaking, the appropriate expression should be “non-employment”. I will refer to this
eﬀect as the “unemployment” eﬀect of the minimum wage. Throughout the paper I will use nonemployment and unemployment interchangeably, given that the model cannot distinguish these
eﬀects.
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the minimum wage; and (iii) workers who do not comply with the policy retain the
same wage, that is, Wi (1) = Wi (0).8,9
The goal of the exercise is to recover the parameters of the underlying latent
distribution of market wages (µ, σ) and the parameters (πd , πm , πu ) that govern
how the minimum wage aﬀects the economy. The key contribution of Meyer and
Wise is to show that those parameters are identiﬁed using data on observed wages
(Wi (1)). Perhaps surprisingly, one need not have any variation in the policy to recover its eﬀects. To observe how this is achieved, deﬁne the log-likelihood of observing
Wi (1) = w as: log L(Wi = w|µ, σ, π) = 1I{w < m} log πd f0c (w) +1I{w = m} log πm Fc0 (m) +
1I{w > m} log f0 (m)
, where 1I{A} is the indicator function of the event A and c ≡
c
1 − πu F0 (m) is a rescaling factor that ensures that the observed density of wages integrates to one. The parameter c can be interpreted as the ratio of employment before
and after the introduction of the policy. Meyer and Wise use maximum-likelihood to
estimate the parameters of the model. An intuitive way to think about the identiﬁcation is to recognize that the model allows us to use the information on wages above
the minimum wage level to predict the shape of the wage distribution in the absence
of the policy.10

8

At ﬁrst glance, the restriction (i) may not appear problematic, as it is diﬃcult to imagine why
someone would comply with the policy by increasing a worker’s wage to a value greater than m.
This is not impossible, however. An example of a model that is excluded by this assumption is that
of Teulings (2000).
9
Restriction (ii) can be relaxed in certain ways, for example, by making the probabilities
(πd , πm , πu ) low-order polynomials of the worker’s latent wage. Restriction (iii) can be relaxed
without aﬀecting the identiﬁcation strategy by making the worker draw from the distribution of
market wages conditional on values below the minimum wage. Changes to the average wages of
those who do not comply with the policy also can be incorporated. However, this change requires
some modiﬁcations in the identiﬁcation strategy.
10
A closer inspection on the likelihood function shows that Meyer and Wise’s approach nests
“standard measurement”, truncation and censoring of the wages below the threshold m. If πu is
equal to one, the likelihood function of Meyer and Wise’s model is the same as the likelihood of a
truncation model. If πm is equal to one, the likelihood of the model is the same as the likelihood
of a Tobit model (censoring). If the probability of non-compliance πd is equal to one, the likelihood
becomes the standard likelihood of a normal distribution, with no censoring or truncation. Moreover,
the probabilities of “measurement”, truncation and censoring have a direct economic interpretation
as diﬀerent responses of the economy to the minimum wage policy.
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3.2. Doyle’s Approach
A limitation of Meyer and Wise’s (1983) approach is that it relies on a parametric assumption concerning the latent wage distribution.11 The contribution of Doyle
(2006) is to show that this is not actually necessary for identiﬁcation when one is
only willing to assume continuity in the distribution of latent wages. The key idea
behind this strategy is that the continuity of the distribution of latent wages implies
that the ratio of the density of observed wages just above and below the minimum
wage identiﬁes πd , the likelihood of non-compliance with the policy.12 In this section,
I discuss the identiﬁcation of the minimum wage eﬀects under the model proposed
by Doyle (2006). In the following discussion, I will maintain assumptions MW2 (no
spillovers) and MW3 (minimum wage eﬀects) from Meyer and Wise (1983). Again,
assume that the econometrician only observes wages in the presence of the policy;
that is, a random sample of size N from the distribution of {Wi (1)} is available.
Assumption D1 The density of latent wages is continuous at m. That is,
limw→m+ f0 (w) = limw→m− f0 (w).
As discussed in Doyle (2006), this assumption exploits the fact that the distribution of worker productivity is likely to be smooth, but the observed density of
wages has a jump around the minimum wage. This jump can provide exactly the
information necessary to trace back the eﬀects of the policy on the outcomes of
interest. Under assumptions MW2 and MW3, there is a relationship between the
latent and observed distribution of wages. This relationship is given by: f (w) =
1I{w < m} πd f0c (w) + 1I{w = m} πm Fc0 (w) + 1I{w > m} f0 (cw) , where c = 1 − πu F0 (m), as
before. Figure 1 provides a graphical example of the relationship between the observed
and the latent densities. Taking the ratio of the density of observed wages just below
and above the minimum wage, that is, considering the lateral limits of the density at
11

The sensitivity of the estimates with respect to the parametric assumptions was studied in
Dickens, Machin and Manning (1998).
12
Given the similarity between this identiﬁcation strategy and RD Designs, Doyle (2006) termed
it a density discontinuity design.
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Figure 1.— Doyle’s Model

m, we have

limw→m− f (w)
limw→m+ f (w)

=

πd f0 (w)
c
f (w)
limw→m+ 0 c

limw→m−

= πd , where the last equality is obtained

using assumption D1. Figure 2 graphically depicts the mechanics of the estimation
of the non-compliance probability. To recover the remaining parameters, it is easy
to see that by integrating the density of observed wages up to the minimum wage,
we have P r[W (1) < m] =

πd F0 (m)
.
c

Then, we have

P r[W (1)=m]
P r[W (1)<m]

=

πm 13
.
πd

Because the

left-hand side of this equation is identiﬁed from the data and the right-hand side is
a function of only one unknown, this implies that πm is identiﬁed. This also implies
that πu = 1 − πd − πm is identiﬁed. To recover the latent density of wages, one needs
to recover F0 (m). This is the case because the relationship between the observed and
latent densities can be inverted once we know the rescaling factor c. To see this, note:
f0 (w) =

f (w)·c
πd

if w < m , and f0 (w) = f (w) · c if w > m.
P r[W (1)<m]
,
P r[W (1)<m]+πd P r[W (1)>m]
πd F0 (m)/c
=
πd F0 (m)/c+πd (1−F0 (m))/c

One way to identify F0 (m) is to use the fact that F0 (m) =
which

follows

F0 (m)
F0 (m)+1−F0 (m)

from:

P r[W (1)<m]
P r[W (1)<m]+πd P r[W (1)>m]

=

= F0 (m). This implies that the latent distribution of wages can

be recovered under assumptions D1, MW1, and MW2. The discontinuity in the
13

Interestingly, the identiﬁcation of πm also can be understood in terms of a discontinuity. The ratio
πm /πd is identiﬁed by a discontinuity in the distribution of wages at the m. Thus, the identiﬁcation
of Doyle’s model uses a discontinuity in the CDF of wages to identify πm /πd and a discontinuity in
the density of wages to identify πd .
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Figure 2.— Doyle’s Model: Identiﬁcation

observed distribution around the minimum wage identiﬁes the probability of noncompliance with the policy πd .14 This in turn allows us to recover πm , F0 (m) and,
consequently, the entire latent wage distribution.15
3.3. Minimum Wage Eﬀects in a Dual Economy
The Brazilian economy, similar to those of many other developing countries, is
characterized by a large informal sector. In Brazil, an informal worker is deﬁned as a
worker whose worker’s card does not include a signed labor contract. Informality is
thought to arise in developing countries as a result of restrictive and costly labor laws.
Note that once the worker’s card is signed, the collection of labor taxes should follow
and compliance with minimum wage and other labor standards has to be assured.
A natural question that arises in this context is the following: What is the role of
14

Each step after the identiﬁcation of πd from the limit of the ratio of densities relies on the
assumption that this probability is not a function of the wage. This feature contrasts with the
parametric model of Meyer and Wise. By restricting the set of latent wage distributions, more
ﬂexibility can be introduced in the functional form of the relationship between the latent wage W (0)
and the model parameter πd . This is the case because the shape of the latent wage distribution can
be recovered in the parametric setting using the information above the minimum wage. This allows
us to identify not only a probability of non-compliance but also a function πd (w) that maps wages
to non-compliance probabilities. This function need not be constant with respect to latent wages.
15
Doyle’s model can be identiﬁed under the assumption that πd is a low-order polynomial of the
latent wage. However, in this case, identiﬁcation can only be achieved by using derivatives of the
wage density at the minimum wage level.
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the minimum wage in a economy with such a large informal sector? A large fraction
of contracts outside the “umbrella” of the labor laws may be a consequence of the
minimum wage, meaning that many workers (intentionally or not) have moved to the
informal sector as a consequence of the minimum wage policy. However, in principle,
it could also be the case that the observed proportion of workers in the informal
sector is completely unrelated to the level of the minimum wage. Informality may
instead depend on labor taxes and other forms of labor regulation (hours worked, job
safety standards and so forth) that have to be met regardless of where the worker
is located in the wage distribution. These two explanations have markedly diﬀerent
policy implications but are in principle equally plausible explanations for the observed
size of the informal sector. One of the goals of this paper is to assess the relative
importance of these explanations.
To do so, I generalize the models of Meyer and Wise (1983) and Doyle (2006) to the
case of a dual economy. I model the joint distribution of wages and sectors (latent and
observed), as opposed to the marginal distribution of wages. This allows me to infer
the size of the formal sector that would prevail in the absence of the minimum wage
and compute the proportion of workers who move to the informal sector in response
to the policy.
Let worker i be characterized by a pair of wage (Wi (1)) and sector (Si (1)), which
is equal to one if he is employed in the formal sector and zero otherwise. Compliance
with minimum wage legislation is perfect in the formal sector but not in the informal
sector. This eﬀectively means that the workers in the formal sector are not allowed
to have wages below the minimum wage once the policy is introduced. If they remain
employed in the presence of the policy, they must either move to an informal contract
or comply with the policy by receiving a wage equal to m. In addition, for each
worker, deﬁne a pair (Wi (0), Si (0)) that denotes the counterfactual - or latent - wage
and sector in the absence of the minimum wage. Finally, deﬁne F0 (w) (f0 (w)) as the
c.d.f (p.d.f) of W (0) and F (w) (f (w)) as the c.d.f (p.d.f) of observed wages (Wi (1)
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or, in short notation, Wi ). I will assume that the latent wage and sector distribution
have the following characteristics:
Assumption 1 (Continuity)

The density of latent wages and its ﬁrst derivative are

continuous at m. That is, limw→m+ f0 (w) = limw→m− f0 (w), and limw→m+ f00 (w) =
limw→m− f00 (w).
Because this is a model of the joint distribution of sector and wages, we need to
deﬁne another object, P r[S(0) = 1|W (0) = w]:
Assumption 2 (Conditional probability of (latent) sector given the wage)

The con-

ditional distribution of latent sector given the latent wage belongs to a parametric
family {Λ(w, β) : β ∈ B ⊂ Rk }. That is, P r[S(0) = 1|W (0) = w] = Λ(w, β) for some
β0 ∈ B. Moreover, P r[Λ(W (0), β0 ) =
6 Λ(W (0), β 0 )|W (0) > m] > 0 for all β 0 =
6 β0 .
With the conditional probability of latent sector (given the wage) and the marginal
distribution of latent wages, we have completely speciﬁed the joint distribution of
these variables.16 The restrictive part of this assumption is that the conditional probability of the latent sector given latent wages can be described by a parametric model.
The ﬁrst part of the above assumption states that there is a parameter β for which
the probability of the latent sector given the latent wage w is exactly equal to Λ(w, β).
The second part of the assumption ensures that there is only one parameter for which
this condition holds. Both assumptions are standard in models with binary outcomes.
For concreteness, assume that the parametric model is a logit.17,18
16

This joint distribution could come, for example, from a Roy-type model of sector choice, in
which workers would choose the sector that yields the highest utility. Another model would be one
in which workers are assigned to ﬁrms that, based on labor taxes and probability of punishment,
decide whether they will employ formal or informal workers.
17
The logistic functional form is assumed only for clarity in the exposition. All identiﬁcation
results are preserved if the logistic functional form is replaced by another parametric form, such as
a probit. Moreover, one can make the model ﬂexible by adding higher-order polynomials of wages
(squares and cubes) as regressors in the logit to better adjust the curve. As long as the degree k of
the polynomial is ﬁxed with respect to the sample size, that is, the model remains parametric, the
identiﬁcation results will hold.
18
The reason for the need of a parametric model, as will become clear in the identiﬁcation section,
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Assumption 3 (No spillovers) Workers whose latent wages would be above the minimum wage are not aﬀected by the policy. That is, W (1) = W (0) and S(1) = S(0)
when W (0) > m.
This assumption is potentially strong. In the non-parametric framework, this assumption is also untestable. However, it is straightforward to see that the model is
still identiﬁed under any known and invertible spillover function. Moreover, bounds
can be computed for the parameters when positive spillovers are assumed to exist and
the researcher has no prior information on their size.19 Furthermore, spillovers can
also be identiﬁed and estimated if one is willing to assume a parametric family for
the latent wage distribution. In the empirical application I investigate the robustness
of my results to the presence of limited spillovers.
To complete the model we need to deﬁne the minimum wage eﬀects in the lowertail of the wage distribution. As discussed by Meyer and Wise, workers in sectors
operating in competitive markets whose wages would be below the minimum might
become unemployed as a result of the minimum wage. If there is some bargaining
involved in the wage determination, or if the employers hold market power, some
workers will “cluster” at the minimum as a result of the policy. Finally, because
compliance with the minimum is imperfect in some markets, workers might migrate
from the formal to the informal sector to avoid unemployment. In terms of the model,
this leads to the following assumption:
Assumption 4 (Minimum wage eﬀects)

For wages below the minimum wage

(W (0) < m), we have the following: If S(0) = 0, then S(1) = S(0). Moreover,
(0)

with probability πd , the wage continues to be observed (W (1) = W (0)). With the
(0)

(0)

complementary probability πm = 1 − πd , the worker earns the minimum wage
is that this model induces censoring in the probabilities of working in the formal sector for wages
below the minimum wage. This forces us to rely on extrapolation using values above the minimum
to identify the share of formal workers for low wages. The need for extrapolation excludes nonparametric methods as an option.
19
See Appendix E.5 for further discussion of this issue.
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(1)

(W (1) = m).20 If S(0) = 1, then with probability πd , the wage continues to
be observed (W (1) = W (0)), meaning that the worker successfully transits from
the formal sector to the informal sector.21 In this case, the observed sector will be
(1)

S(1) = 0, being diﬀerent from the latent sector. With probability πm , the worker
earns the minimum wage (W (1) = m, S(1) = 1). With the complementary probability
(1)

(1)

(1)

(πu = 1 − πd − πm ), the worker becomes unemployed (W (1) = ·, S(1) = ·).22
3.4. Discussion
The goal of the exercise is to recover the unknown parameters π
(1)

(1)

(1)

(0)

≡

(0)

(πd , πm , πu , πd , πm )0 and the joint distribution of latent sector and wages, that
is, the joint density that would prevail in the absence of the minimum wage. By comparing this distribution with the observed distribution, I can evaluate the impact of
the minimum wage on expected wages, wage inequality, employment and other labor
market outcomes. By deﬁning the latent sector and the sector-speciﬁc parameters,
a broader range of implications of the minimum wage becomes assessable, such as
changes in tax revenues and movements between sectors. In Sections 3.5 and 6.3, I
will discuss in detail how the minimum wage aﬀects these outcomes.
The assumptions used in this model are similar to the assumptions used previously
in this literature. I maintain all assumptions from Doyle – or Meyer and Wise, if one
20

(0)

The reason for allowing πm to be greater than zero, that is, to allow workers in the informal
sector to cluster at the minimum wage, is for the model to account for the empirical fact that they
seem to do so. The informal sector wage distribution presents a spike similar to the formal sector
distribution at the minimum wage. The economic logic behind this regularity is under debate. One
hypothesis is that the minimum wage acts as a signal to the agents of a fair price for unskilled labor,
which might aﬀect the way workers in the informal sector bargain with their employers. This feature
seems to be related to the “self-enforcing” nature of the minimum wage.
21
The assumption that the wage remains exactly the same when the worker moves to the informal
sector, that is (W (1) = W (0)), substantially simpliﬁes the exposition. The same results hold when
this assumption is replaced with one in which the worker draws a new wage from f0 (w|S(0) =
1, W (0) < m).
(1)
(1)
22
To ease the exposition, I have assumed that πm and πu do not vary as a function of the latent
wage. In this case in which they vary over the latent wages, the parameter recovered by assuming
(1)
(1)
that they are constants is the expectation of the distribution of πm and πu over the distribution
(1)
of wages below the minimum. This result holds only as long as πd remains constant as a function
of the wage.
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prefers a parametric speciﬁcation for latent wages – and generalize their approach
to address sector-speciﬁc responses. Assumption 4, the assumption that deﬁnes the
sector-speciﬁc eﬀects of the minimum wage, implies the assumptions used by Meyer
and Wise (1983) and Doyle (2006) concerning the marginal distribution of wages.
That is, the marginal distribution of wages (which is obtained after integrating out
the sector-speciﬁc wage distributions) will resemble the density of wages that appears
in Meyer and Wise (1983) and Doyle (2006).
Despite these similarities, there are numerous advantages of using a model for the
joint distribution of sector and wages. This is especially true for developing countries,
where the informal sector plays an important role in the economy. This model accommodates a variety of responses of the economy to the minimum wage policy. The
model allows for the standard unemployment eﬀect. The model allows the minimum
wage to have a “supporting” eﬀect on the lower tail of the wage distribution in such a
way that the policy can aﬀect average wages and wage inequality. The model allows
wages in the informal sector to be aﬀected by the introduction of the minimum wage
(0)

– an eﬀect captured by the parameter πm . This model also allows workers to move
to the informal sector as a response to the minimum wage – this event is captured by
(1)

the parameter πd . Combined, these unemployment and sector mobility eﬀects allow
the minimum wage to aﬀect the relative size of the formal sector in the economy,
which in turn can aﬀect labor tax revenues.
A two-sector model helps to interpret the parameters identiﬁed in the previous work
from Meyer and Wise (1983) and Doyle (2006). Meyer and Wise discuss the possible
reasons that one would observe a non-zero density of wages below the minimum,
such as uncovered jobs and non-compliance in covered sectors. Ultimately, however,
Meyer and Wise’s model identiﬁes the aggregate likelihood of non-compliance (πd ).
This parameter is the proportion of workers who, following the introduction of the
minimum wage, do not ultimately respond to the policy. An application of the law of
iterated expectations shows that the parameter estimated in their model is a weighted
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average of the sector-speciﬁc parameters, with weights given by the latent shares of
the sectors in the economy. The parameter πd does not identify whether workers earn
sub-minimum wages because they would already be working in non-covered sectors
regardless of the policy or because they moved there as a response to the policy. These
two diﬀerent stories are implied by diﬀerent values of the sector-speciﬁc parameters.
However, they can imply the exact same value for πd . Moreover, any combination of
the two is also equally likely when one estimates only the aggregate or “unconditional”
(1)

parameter πd . Thus, the sector mobility parameter πd

and the latent size of the

uncovered sector P r[S(0) = 1] are more economically meaningful than the aggregate
parameters.

3.5. Model Analysis
In this section, I show that this model can capture a wide range of potential eﬀects of
the minimum wage policy. To do so, I discuss the model’s implications for some objects
of interest, such as the sector-speciﬁc wage densities and the conditional probability
of formality given the wage.
Given assumptions 2 to 4 above, there is a relationship between the latent and ob0 (w)
+
served unconditional wage distributions. It is given by: f (w) = 1I{w < m} πd (w)f
c
R m πm (w)f0 (w)
R
m (1)
1I{w = m}
dw + 1I{w > m} f0 (cw) , where c ≡ 1 −
πu Λ(w)f0 (w)dw is a
c

rescaling factor that ensures both densities integrate to one. This parameter has the
interpretation as the ratio of employment in the presence of the policy to that in the
absence of the policy.
Regarding the relationship between the sector-speciﬁc parameters and the aggregate
(1)

(0)

(1)

(0)

ones, we have πd (w) ≡ Λ(w)πd + (1 − Λ(w))πd , πm (w) ≡ Λ(w)πm + (1 − Λ(w))πm ,
(1)

and πu (w) ≡ Λ(w)πu . The parameters πd (w), πm (w) and πu (w) are weighted averages
of the sector-speciﬁc parameters with weights given by the relative shares of each
sector in the latent distribution. They describe the unconditional probability of noncompliance, “clustering” at the minimum wage level and unemployment at a given
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Figure 3.— Dual-economy Model: Latent and Observed Densities

value of the wage. These are the parameters estimated in the previous approach
employed by Meyer and Wise (1983) and Doyle (2006).23
Examining the sector-speciﬁc wage density, one can see that for the formal sector, we
(1)

have: f (w|S(1) = 1) = 1I{w < m}0+1I{w = m} πm

F0 (m|S(0)=1)
+1I{w
c(1)

> m} f0 (w|S(0)=1)
.
c(1)

0 (w|S(0)=0)
For the informal sector, we have f (w|S(1) = 0) = 1I{w < m} πd (w)f
+
(1−Λ(w))c(0)
(0)

1I{w = m} πm
(1)

1)(1 − πm )

F0 (m|s(0)=0)
+1I{w > m} f0 (w|S(0)=0)
, where I deﬁne c(1) ≡ 1−F0 (w|S(0) =
c(0)
c(0)
(1) R m Λ(w)
and c(0) ≡ 1 + πd
f (w|S(0) = 0)dw so that both densities inte1−Λ(w) 0

grate to one. They have the interpretation of the ratio of employment observed in the
sector to that in the absence of the policy. Figures 1 and 3 display the relationship
between the latent and observed densities for the aggregate wage distribution, for the
formal sector, and for the informal sector, respectively.
The dual-economy model preserves the same relationship between the latent and
observed unconditional wage densities as in Meyer and Wise’s model. However, the
dual-economy model presents heterogeneity in the responses to the minimum wage
across sectors. The formal sector wage density below the minimum wage vanishes,
whereas in the informal sector, the density grows according to the inﬂow of workers
from the formal sector. As a result, the density in the informal sector below the minimum wage can, for some values of the model parameters, present a discontinuity at
23

Note that, here, they are allowed to be functions of w as long as the latent sizes of the sectors
diﬀer across wages and the model parameters diﬀer across sectors.
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Figure 4.— Dual-economy Model: Latent and Observed Conditional Probabilities

the minimum wage with the “inverse” shape relative to that observed in the aggregate
wage distribution.
Regarding the conditional probability of working in the formal sector as a
function of the wage, we have: P r[S(1) = 1|W (1) = w] = 1I{w < m}0 +
(1)

1I{w = m}

πm
R

Rm

m

f0 (w)Λ(w)dw
πm (w)f0 (w)dw

+ 1I{w > m}Λ(w). Figure 4 graphically displays the re-

lationship between the latent and the observed probabilities of formality with respect
to the wage. The model oﬀers a sharp prediction concerning the eﬀect of the minimum
wage on the conditional probability of the sector given the wage. It states that for
values above the minimum wage, this probability is equal to the latent probability
(P r[S(0) = 1|W (0) > m] = P r[S(1) = 1|W (1) > m]). It states that the probability of working in the formal sector given the wage will be zero for values below
the minimum wage. At the minimum wage level, it should be a particular constant
(

(1) R
πm m Λ(w)f0 (w)dw
Rm
),
πm (w)f0 (w)dw

which is likely diﬀerent from this function’s left and right limits.

This result follows from the fact that workers are not able to maintain wages below
m in the formal sector and the assumption of the absence of spillovers above the
minimum wage level.
It is helpful to understand the implications of the model using limiting cases for
(1)

the parameter values. For example, if πd tends to zero, there is no mobility between
(1)

sectors. At the other extreme, when πd

tends to one, all aﬀected workers in the
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formal sector manage to ﬁnd a job in the informal sector, which also implies no
employment eﬀects from the minimum wage. In general, the employment eﬀect will
(1)

be given by πu F0 (m|S(0) = 1)P r[S(0) = 1], which means that the employment
loss will be higher when the mass of workers for whom the minimum wage “bites” is
larger, and when the size of the formal sector is larger. In terms of market structures
(1)

that could generate these values, πd tends to one if the economy can be described
by a simple two-sector model with imperfect compliance with the minimum wage and
(1)

costless sector mobility. πm tends to be higher if the economy primarily consists of
(1)

employers with monopsonistic power in the labor market, and πu tends to be higher
if the labor market operates close to perfect competition and mobility to the informal
sector is limited.
4. IDENTIFICATION
It is not possible to directly use the techniques developed in Doyle (2006) in each
sector separately, as I have introduced movements between them. To identify the
model, a diﬀerent approach must be used. Below, I state the main identiﬁcation results
of this paper, which concern the identiﬁcation of (a) the latent joint distribution
of sector and wages; that is, the distribution that would prevail in the absence of
the minimum wage; (b) the vector of parameters π that governs how the minimum
wage aﬀects the economy; (c) the eﬀects of the minimum wage on functionals of the
distribution of sector and wages; and (d) the eﬀects of the minimum wage on labor tax
revenues. In what follows, assume that the econometrician observes a random sample
of the pair {(Wi (1), Si (1))} of size N from a population of interest. I also assume the
following easily veriﬁable technical conditions: the minimum wage m is set at a point
with non-zero density, that is, f0 (m) > 0, P r[W (1) < m] > 0, and Λ0 (m; β) 6= 0.
Lemma 4.1 (Identiﬁcation of sector-speciﬁc parameters) Under Assumptions 1, 2, 3, and 4, π is identiﬁed. Proof: See Appendix A.
Lemma 4.2 (Identiﬁcation of latent distributions) Under Assumptions 1, 2,
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3 and 4, the latent joint distribution of sector and wages is identiﬁed. Proof: See
Appendix A.
Corollary 4.3 (Identiﬁcation of the minimum wage treatment eﬀects)
Under Assumptions 1, 2, 3 and 4, the eﬀects of the minimum wage on functionals of
the joint distribution of sector and wages are identiﬁed. Examples of such functionals
are the eﬀects of the minimum wage on average wages, on the standard deviation of
wages, on quantiles of the wage distribution, on the size of the formal and informal
sectors and on the average wages conditional on sectors.
Corollary 4.4 (Identiﬁcation of the minimum wage eﬀects on labor tax
revenues)
Under Assumptions 1, 2, 3, and 4 and assuming no tax revenues from the informal
sector, the eﬀects of the minimum wage on labor tax revenues are identiﬁed. Identiﬁcation of the eﬀects of the minimum wage on labor tax revenues holds as long as the
eﬀects can be written as a functional of the latent and observed wage distributions
and the model parameters π.24
The key points that permit the identiﬁcation are as follows: The shape of the
relationship between sector and wages for values above the minimum wage is preserved
in the presence of the policy. This allows us to obtain estimates of the latent share of
the formal sector for values below the minimum wage level by extrapolating the curve
we observe in the upper part of the wage distribution.25 The identiﬁcation of the latent
wage density builds on the approach in Doyle (2006) in the sense that the probability
24

See Section 6.3 for further discussion of this issue.
The relationship between latent sector and wages can only be observed for values above m.
If this function is speciﬁed non-parametrically, the latent share of formal workers for values below
m would essentially be unidentiﬁed. However, by relying on the parametric functional form, I can
extrapolate the relationship observed above m to predict the latent share of workers that would
prevail below the minimum wage in the absence of the policy. This is achieved by estimating the
parameters of the function Λ(w) using wages above m and then using the estimated parameters for
the prediction for all wages, both above and below m.
25
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of non-compliance with the policy is identiﬁed using the ratio of the density of wages
above and below the minimum wage level. To complete the identiﬁcation, the sectorspeciﬁc parameters are identiﬁed using the derivative of the wage density.26
Figure 5.— Dual Economy Model: Latent and Observed Conditional Probabilities
under Independence

5. ESTIMATION
In this section, I discuss how to estimate the model parameters and latent distributions using non-parametric kernel methods. The non-parametric estimation strategy
used here is local linear density estimators.
As in Doyle (2006), the model can also be estimated without assuming that the
latent wage distribution belongs to a known parametric family. A crucial step in
obtaining non-parametric estimates of the objects of interest, such as the model parameters and the counterfactual distributions, involves the estimation of a ratio of
one-sided limits of the density at the minimum wage. The estimation of these quantities can be performed using non-parametric methods. Note that because the density
is discontinuous around the minimum wage, only observations below the minimum
are informative for limw→m− f (w) (and similarly for the density above the minimum).
26

If latent sector and wages are independent, one need not resort to the derivative of the wage
density at m. In this case, identiﬁcation of the sector-speciﬁc parameters can be achieved by examining the distribution of wages given the sector. See Appendix B for a detailed discussion of this
issue.
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This implies that the estimators of these quantities will behave as if the minimum
wage were a boundary point of the density, which has implications in terms of bias
and variance.
Therefore, it is advisable to use methods ensuring that the performance of the
density estimator is satisfactory on points that are close to the support boundaries. I
use local linear density estimators, which have the same order of bias at the boundary
as at interior points of the distribution.27 In Appendix C, I formally describe how to
non-parametrically perform the density estimation.
For the remaining terms that need to be estimated, I will use the plug-in approach
and replace the unknown objects in the identiﬁcation section with their consistent
estimators. Thus π
bd (m) ≡

fb(m− )
,
fb(m+ )

where fb(m− ) is the estimator of the density just

below the minimum wage value using the local linear density estimator. In addition,
 b0 −

)
fb(m− ) fb0 (m+ )
for the estimator of πd0 (m), we can deﬁne πbd 0 (m) ≡ ffb0 (m
−
.
fb(m+ )
fb(m+ )
(m+ )
To complete the process of recovering the structural parameters π, one requires estimates of Λ(m) and Λ0 (m). These objects are the latent share of the formal sector and
the change in it at m. For that purpose, one needs to estimate β. Given Assumptions 2
P
2
and 3, the estimator can be deﬁned as: βb ≡ arg minβ N
i=1 (Si −Λ(Wi ; β)) 1I{Wi > m}.
Then, given that we estimated β, we can plug it into the function Λ(.) to obb
= Λ(m; βb)
tain an estimate of Λ(m) and Λ0 (m). They will be given by Λ(m)
b m) of the latent share of the forb0 (m) = Λ0 (m; βb). Using the estimate Λ(
and Λ
(1)

mal sector, we can deﬁne the plug-in estimator for the parameters πd
(0)

π
bd

≡ π
bd (m) −

b
Λ(m)
bd0 (m),
b 0 (m) π
Λ

(1)

and π
bd

(0)

and πd :

(0)
−1
b
b
≡ [b
πd (m) − (1 − Λ(m))
·π
bd ] · Λ(m)
. To

complete the estimation, we ﬁrst need to estimate c before we recover the latent
R m fb(u)
wage density: b
c≡[
du + 1 − Fb(m)]−1 . Then, the estimates of the latent wage
π
bd (u)
27

This estimator builds on the idea of local linear conditional mean estimators. It begins by
dividing the support of the density into a set of bins. Then, a “response variable” is deﬁned as the
bin counts of these disjoint intervals. After this process, one is left with a vector containing the
“independent variable,” which are the bin centers, and a corresponding “dependent variable,” the
bin counts. Finally, standard local polynomial smoothing estimates are applied to these constructed
variables. See McCrary (2008) for a detailed discussion of this issue.
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TABLE I
Descriptive Statistics

b c
b
distribution can be deﬁned, for w 6= m, as: fb0 (w) = 1I{w < m} πbf d(w)b
+ 1I{w > m} f (w)
.
(w)
b
c

b
The consistency of the π
b, βb and, consequently, Λ(w)
and fb(w) follows directly
from the identiﬁcation equations and the consistency of fb(w) and fb0 (w). Closedform expressions for the asymptotic variances can be derived. However, I will rely on
resampling methods to estimate them in the empirical application.
6. EMPIRICAL APPLICATION: THE EFFECT OF THE MINIMUM WAGE IN BRAZIL
For my empirical application, I consider a stronger version of Assumption 2:
Assumption 5

Independence: P r[S(0) = 1|W (0) = w] = Λ

∀ w.

This assumption implies that latent sector and wages are independent. Figure 5
displays the relationship between the latent and observed conditional probabilities
of formality with respect to the wages under this assumption. This assumption is
testable. Below, I provide evidence that it is not violated in the context of the Brazilian
labor market.
Independence greatly simpliﬁes the identiﬁcation and estimation, as can be seen
in Appendix B. Independence (and the absence of spillovers) allows me to identify
the latent share of the formal sector by examining the observed share of the formal
sector for wages that are above the minimum wage level. Moreover, it implies that
the aggregate minimum wage probabilities (πd (w),πm (w),πu (w)) do not vary across
wages even if the parameters diﬀer across sectors. This is because the latent share
of each sector becomes constant with respect to wages. This allows me to identify
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TABLE II
Descriptive Statistics by Sector
Formal Sector

Informal Sector

Diﬀerence

Wage

874.599
(1.716)

556.114
(3.755)

318.485***
(3.661)

Female

0.359
(0.001)

0.340
(0.001)

0.019***
(0.001)

White

0.583
(0.001)

0.482
(0.001)

0.101***
(0.001)

Education

10.246
(0.006)

8.840
(0.010)

1.406***
(0.011)

Tenure

4.639
(0.009)

3.134
(0.013)

1.505***
(0.017)

Age

33.312
(0.015)

32.003
(0.026)

1.309***
(0.030)

Minimum wage worker

0.103
(0.000)

0.151
(0.001)

-0.047***
(0.001)

N

420,097

159,155

-

the model parameters by simply examining the discontinuity in the aggregate wage
distribution at m and the sector-speciﬁc wage distributions, so I will not need to rely
on estimating the ﬁrst derivative of the wage distribution at the boundary point, m.
In Appendix B, I describe how to identify the model under this condition. The
estimation strategy I use follows the same method as in the general form of the
model. That is, I estimate the density of wages at the boundary using local linear
density estimators and use a plug-in method for the remaining objects. Namely, once
I estimate the lateral limits of the density of wages at m, I complete the estimation
by replacing the objects in the identifying equations using their respective sample
counterparts. In the next sections, I describe the data and discuss the results obtained
when estimating this model for the Brazilian labor market.
6.1. Data and Descriptive Statistics
To evaluate the eﬀects of the minimum wage on labor market outcomes, I used
data for the period from 2001 to 2009 from the PNAD dataset. These data have been
collected by the IBGE – which is a Portuguese acronym for “Brazilian Institute of
Geography and Statistics” – since 1967 and contain information on income, education,
labor force participation, migration, health and other socioeconomic characteristics
of the Brazilian population. Workers who do not report wages, those who work in
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TABLE III
Descriptive Statistics: Conditional Probabilities
P r[W = m]

P r[W < m]

Unconditional

P r[S = 1] P r[S = 0]
0.738

0.262

0.116

0.073

Conditional on sector
Formal
Informal

1.000
0.000

0.000
1.000

0.103
0.151

0.006
0.265

Conditional on wage
W <m
W =m
W >m

0.056
0.659
0.811

0.944
0.341
0.189

0.000
1.000
0.000

1.000
0.000
0.000

Conditional on gender
Male
Female

0.732
0.748

0.268
0.252

0.099
0.147

0.066
0.088

Conditional on race
White
Non-white

0.773
0.694

0.227
0.306

0.082
0.157

0.047
0.107

Conditional on education
Less than 5 years
Less than 12 years
More than 12 years

0.576
0.672
0.797

0.424
0.328
0.203

0.180
0.143
0.041

0.179
0.108
0.022

Conditional on region
South
Southeast
Center-West
North
Northeast

0.803
0.778
0.706
0.623
0.608

0.197
0.222
0.294
0.377
0.392

0.062
0.079
0.129
0.182
0.246

0.040
0.041
0.050
0.106
0.198

Note: N = 579,252

the public sector and workers who are older than 60 years of age or younger than 18
years of age were removed from the sample. The PNAD dataset includes information
on the worker’s labor contract status, which was used to deﬁne formality.
The variable of interest – the wage – is measured at the monthly level, which is the
most natural unit in the Brazilian institutional context. A feature of the Brazilian
labor market is that wages are typically speciﬁed at the monthly level, the same unit
of measure as the minimum wage. The labor contract also establishes the number of
hours of work per day (typically 6 or 8 hours).28 I will treat the wage reported in the
survey as the contracted wage, so no adjustment for hours need to be performed. As
a result, wages below the minimum wage are not, in principle, a result of a “division
bias”.
The empirical strategy will assume also that the wage is measured without error.
This is unquestionably a strong assumption. The observed wage distribution presents
28

At the end of the month the worker will receive a payment “pro rata” based on the actual
number of days he or she worked. This payment will present some small variation across months
due to reasons such as holidays, absences, overtime pay and the like.
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Figure 6.— Wage Densities

Note: Local linear density estimates using Silverman’s rule of thumb bandwidth.

heaping at round numbers. I will show that the estimates of the parameters of the
model are fairly robust to the presence of heaping by using diﬀerent values of the
bandwidth in the density estimation.
As mentioned above, all workers in Brazil carry an oﬃcial document called “Carteira
de Trabalho” (worker’s card). This document is signed by the employers in the formal
act of hiring. The lack of a formal signed labor contract means that the employer is
not forced to collect labor taxes or to comply with the minimum wage and other
types of regulation. The Brazilian economy is known to be characterized by a large
informal sector. Tables I, II, and III illustrate this fact and describe the main features
of the data.29
Figure 7 displays the empirical CDFs of the formal and informal sectors. A few
interesting facts can be noted: The empirical cumulative distribution of wages seems
to have a spike at the minimum wage level in both sectors, and virtually no worker
29

All estimates are computed using survey weights.
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Figure 7.— Empirical CDFs

in the formal sector receives wages below m. The same pattern appears on Figure 6,
where I display the estimates of the wage density of the formal and informal sectors.
Thus, informality is closely related to sub-minimum wages. However, these concepts
are not equivalent, as a sizable fraction of informal workers earn wages above the
minimum wage level.
Table II shows that workers in the informal sector earn on average approximately
36% less than workers in the formal sector. In addition, in terms of the observable
characteristics, workers in the informal sector are more likely to be male, non-white,
less educated and young. Considering the likelihood of earning minimum and subminimum wages, Table III shows the heterogeneity of these probabilities across population subgroups. For example, white workers are 48% less likely to earn the minimum
wage than are non-white workers. Workers with less than 5 years of education have an
approximately 18% likelihood of earning the minimum wage, whereas the corresponding likelihood is only 4% for workers with more than 12 years of education. Regarding

29
Figure 8.— Real Wages and Minimum Wage Evolution

the geographic variation, workers in the South Region have a 6% probability of earning the minimum wage, whereas workers in the Northeast have an approximately 25%
probability of earning the minimum wage. A similar heterogeneity pattern appears
when we consider the probability of earning sub-minimum wages.
Table III shows that formality presents considerable heterogeneity across observable
characteristics. It shows that the probability of formality is close to zero for workers
with wages below the minimum wage, as predicted by the dual-economy model. Also,
it shows that the probability of working in the formal sector is lower for low education
groups, non-white, and in the North and Northeast regions.
The history of the minimum wage in Brazil began during the Getulio Vargas government, on May 1st, 1940. Initially, the minimum wage varied across regions to
accommodate diﬀerences in price levels across the country. Subsequently, in 1984,
regional minimum wages were uniﬁed into a single wage at the national level.30 The
periodicity of changes in the minimum wage has been annual since the economy stabilized in 1994 (Lemos, 2009). Figure 8 depicts the evolution of average wages, minimum
wage, and diﬀerent quantiles of the wage distribution over the last decade.31
Regarding Figure 8, the challenge of relying on time-series variation to identify the
30

The Constitution of 1988 prohibited the use of the minimum wage as a reference for wage
bargaining for other categories of workers and contracts. The aim of this prohibition was to reduce
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Figure 9.— Kernel Density Estimates
Unconditional Wage Distribution

eﬀects of the minimum wage becomes clear, as there is nearly as much evidence in
favor of the minimum wage aﬀecting the 20th percentile as there is of it aﬀecting the
80th percentile.32 The correlation between minimum wage changes and changes in
such high percentiles of the wage distribution is likely a reﬂection of the pro-cyclical
nature of changes to the minimum wage. Given this, eﬀects of the minimum wage on
other objects such as average wages or lower quantiles that are based on time-series
variation should also be interpreted with caution.

6.2. Main Results
In this section, I will discuss the results obtained after estimating the model for
the Brazilian labor market. The model is estimated (separately) for the years 2001 to
the over-indexation of the economy, which was thought to be fueling inﬂation.
31
Real wages displayed in Figure 8 were computed using the IPCA, a Portuguese acronym for
“Nation-wide consumer price index”. IPCA is the consumer price index used by the Central Bank
in its inﬂation target system.
32
A similar point was made by Lee (1999) when analyzing U.S. data.
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TABLE IV
Model Parameter Estimates by Year

2009. As discussed in the estimation section, all objects in the model can be estimated
by replacing the population object with its sample analog. The only exception to
this is the density of wages at the boundary. To estimate this object, I use a local
linear kernel estimator with a normal kernel and a bandwidth equal to eight times
Silverman’s rule of thumb, which has been shown to be mean squared error optimal
in Monte Carlo simulations. In the robustness section, I show that the estimates are
not sensitive to this choice by using McCrary’s automatic bandwidth selection rule.
Figure 9 shows a plot of the observed density of wages and its latent counterpart. We
can see that, as a consequence of sizable unemployment eﬀects, the observed density
above the minimum wage is higher than the latent density. Due to both truncation
at the minimum and unemployment, the observed density below the minimum wage
is smaller than the latent density. The estimates of the model parameters used to
construct this latent density are shown in Table IV.
In examining the point estimates and standard errors in Table IV, we see sizable
estimates of the unemployment eﬀects of the minimum wage. This result is comparable
to the estimates of πu obtained in other applications of this approach. Doyle, for
example, found that approximately 60% of young workers who would earn below the
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TABLE V
Distributional Effects of the Minimum Wage

minimum became unemployed. A possible explanation for this regularity is that the
reduced-form and panel data approach, such as the work of Card and Krueger (1994),
estimates the eﬀects of marginal changes in the minimum wage, whereas I estimate
the eﬀect of the minimum wage when compared to the counterfactual scenario deﬁned
as the absence of it. High unemployment probabilities can generate a small marginal
eﬀect of the minimum wage, depending on the size of the density around the minimum
wage and the magnitude of the change in the minimum wage.

33

The evidence from Table IV also suggests that sector mobility is limited. The es(1)

timates of the sector-mobility parameter (πd ) are approximately 12%, with a maximum of 22%. I discuss in greater detail the implications of this result in Section
6.3.
As seen in Figure 8, the period of 2001 to 2009 is characterized by an increase in
the real value of the minimum wage. We should expect the estimates of the mass of
33

Jales (2015) discusses the predictions of this Dual-economy model for marginal changes in the
minimum wage under a parametric assumption for the latent distribution of wages.
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TABLE VI
The Geographic Heterogeneity of Minimum Wage Effects

aﬀected workers, F0 (m), to reﬂect this feature of the data. Regarding Table IV, we
observe a close relationship between the minimum wage level and estimates of F0 (m).
The correlation coeﬃcient with the minimum wage level is approximately 0.90.34
Table V shows how the minimum wage aﬀects the shape of the (log-) wage distribution. Here, I compute the eﬀects of the minimum wage on the usual measures of
wage inequality, such as the standard deviation of log wages and the Gini coeﬃcient.
The estimates show that the minimum wage has a positive impact on average wages
(conditional on employment). The maximum diﬀerence is .39 log points in 2007, and
the minimum is .18 in 2002. The minimum wage also reduces wage inequality, as measured by diﬀerences in quantiles, the standard deviation, or the Gini coeﬃcient. These
estimates indicate the trade-oﬀ faced by policy makers when choosing the minimum
wage level. On the one hand, there is a gain in terms of reducing wage inequality and
increasing average wages. On the other hand, workers tend to have more diﬃculty
ﬁnding jobs.
The Brazilian economy is characterized by considerable geographic variation in the
size of the formal sector, as shown in Table III. The size of the formal sector in the
34

The results also suggests a high correlation over time between unemployment estimates (πu )
and the minimum wage level.

34
Southeast region is approximately 0.78, whereas in the Northeast region the size of
the formal sector is approximately 0.61. Table VI shows the model parameter estimates separately for the Southeast and Northeast regions. In the Northeast region
the minimum wage “bites” at a much higher point in the wage distribution when
compared to the Southeast. The latent size of the formal sector in the Southeast is
0.81. In the Northeast region, the latent size is 0.76. These regions also diﬀer in their
responses to the (same) minimum wage policy. In the Southeast, we observe a high
probability of unemployment (0.65). We also observe a low estimate of the sector
mobility parameter (0.04). In the Northeast, we observe a lower probability of unemployment (0.33), higher probability of non-compliance (0.33), and higher probability
of moving to the informal sector (.26).35
(0)

Regarding the informal sector parameters, πd

(0)

and πm , I do not reject the null

hypothesis that the coeﬃcients are the same across regions. This suggest that the
diﬀerences we observe in the joint distribution of sector and wages across these regions come from diﬀerences in their latent distributions and diﬀerences in the formal
sector’s response to the minimum wage. A decomposition exercise based on the estimates from Table VI show that approximately 72% of the diﬀerences in the observed
size of the formal sector between the Northeast and the Southeast are a result of the
minimum wage. The remaining 28% of the diﬀerences in the size of the formal sector
across these regions are due to other economic factors that cause the Southeast to
have a larger size of the formal sector beyond their diﬀerences in the minimum wage
eﬀects. This exercise indicates that the minimum wage aﬀects a substantially larger
proportion of workers in the Northeast economy, thereby inducing a larger inﬂow of
workers to the informal sector in that region.

35

The region where the latent size of the formal sector is higher also presented a higher likelihood
of sector mobility. This result may also suggest that formal and informal sectors operate in most
cases in distinct labor markets, in the sense that they are located in diﬀerent geographic regions or
diﬀerent industries. This could be one explanation for the small estimates of the likelihood of sector
mobility found in the aggregate economy.
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TABLE VII
Minimum Wage Effects on Labor Tax Revenues

6.3. Tax Revenues and the Size of the Informal Sector
A comparison of Tables I and IV shows that the minimum wage reduces the share
of the formal sector in the economy. This occurs through two diﬀerent but related
channels: First, the minimum wage reduces the size of the formal sector as long as the
unemployment eﬀects are greater than zero, as has been found in Brazil. Second, the
minimum wage increases the size of the informal sector through sector movements
that are driven by the policy itself. Overall, the share of the formal sector in the
Brazilian economy is reduced by approximately 9% as a result of the minimum wage
policy.36
For this reason, the minimum wage indirectly aﬀects the government budget.37 The
minimum wage aﬀects the shape of wage distribution, the relative size of the formal
sector and the likelihood of employment. Each of these eﬀects has the potential to
alter tax revenues.
The goal of this section is to derive an estimate of these eﬀects. I consider the
eﬀects on revenues from the INSS tax, which is the Brazilian labor tax. The INSS
is collected to fund the social insurance system in Brazil, and the rate is 20% for
companies included in the regular system of taxation and 12% for small companies
36

My estimates imply that the mass of workers at and below the minimum wage level is inconsistent
with absence of disemployment eﬀects under smooth non-compliance probabilities and a continuous
latent distribution of wages. The “missing” mass of workers at or below the minimum wage level
is attributed in the model to unemployment eﬀects of the policy. Similarly, high sector-mobility
(1)
probabilities (πd ) are inconsistent with my estimate of the latent share of the formal sector and
the density of low-wages in the informal sector. That is, we do not observe enough small wages in
the informal sector to justify larger sector mobility parameter estimates.
37
Here, I use the term “indirectly” because the minimum wage aﬀects the government’s budget
through the spending channel. This is due to the indexation of pensions to the minimum wage.

36
that opt for the “simpliﬁed” system. To estimate the eﬀects, I will rely on the following
assumption:
Assumption 6

No Tax Revenues in the Informal Sector

Let T (1) represent the tax revenues in the formal sector under the imposition
of a minimum wage and T (0) in its absence.38 By deﬁnition, we have T (1) ≡
PN
PN
i=1 τ (Wi (1))Wi (1)Si (1), and T (0) ≡
i=1 τ (Wi (0))Wi (0)Si (0). The object of interest is the ratio between these two quantities. After some algebra, we have R ≡
T (1)
T (0)

=

P r[S(1)=1]
P r[S(0)=1]

·c·

E[τ (W (1))W (1)|S(1)=1]
.
E[τ (W (0))W (0)|S(0)=1]

This expression is further simpliﬁed in the

Brazilian case, where labor taxes are a constant fraction of wages. In this case, R is
given by: R ≡

T (1)
T (0)

=

P r[S(1)=1]
P r[S(0)=1]

E[W (1)|S(1)=1]
· c · E[W
. Thus, the eﬀects on tax revenues can
(0)|S(0)=1]

be decomposed into three components: compression of the formal sector, employment
eﬀects, and change in expected wages in the formal sector.39 This equation shows that
the tax eﬀect of the minimum wage will depend on the relative magnitude of these
eﬀects.40
I compute the tax eﬀects of the minimum wage using a plug-in approach for the
components of the equation above based on the model parameter estimates from
Table IV. Table VII displays the estimated eﬀects. The minimum wage policy seems
to generate sizable unemployment eﬀects and to reduce the size of the formal sector.
These eﬀects are large enough to compensate for the increase in expected wages.
Therefore, the minimum wage reduces the mass of wages in the formal sector, with a
corresponding decline in labor tax revenues. The estimates range from 3% in 2001 to
11% in 2007.41
38

Note that I abuse notation here and use N to refer to the size of the population, not the size of
the sample.
39
The expression for R, the eﬀect of the minimum wage on labor tax revenues, relies exclusively
on Assumption 6. It does not rely on the particular assumptions I used for the dual economy-model.
40
Note that the parameter R also answers a related question: Is the mass of wages, the sum of the
wages of all workers in the formal sector, higher under the minimum wage or in its absence? Because
the tax rate τ is a constant function of the wages, the eﬀects on tax revenues are proportional to
the eﬀects on the mass of wages.
41
As a sensitivity test, ﬁxing all other parameters, the employment eﬀect of the minimum wage
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Figure 10.— Formality vs. Wages

Note: Conditional probabilities estimates based on a local-constant estimator using an Epanechnikov kernel and the
standard “rule of thumb” bandwidth.

6.4. Testing the Underlying Assumptions and Robustness Checks
This research design allows me to indirectly test some of model assumptions.42
First, I will indirectly test Assumption 5, the independence between latent sector and
wage. This assumption is testable in diﬀerent ways. One way to test it is to consider
the proportion of workers in each sector as a function of the wage. If the assumption holds, this proportion should not vary with the wage for wage values that are
above the minimum.43 A naive regression of formality on wages should mechanically
detect a negative relationship because no worker in the formal sector can earn below
the minimum wage. However, after restricting our attention to wage values above the
minimum, the relationship should disappear. Another related way to test the assumption is to examine the CDF conditional on wages above the minimum. If the model is
correct, diﬀerences in the observed wage distributions across sectors at values above
in 2009 needs to be approximately 28% smaller than my estimates for the minimum wage to have
no eﬀect on labor taxes. Similarly, the minimum wage eﬀect on average wages needs to be underestimated by at least 29.6% for the minimum wage to have no impact on labor tax revenues. This
suggests that the model needs to be severely misspeciﬁed for the estimates of the direction of the
eﬀect to be wrong.
42
I discuss the theory behind the tests performed in this section in Appendix D.
43
See Figure 5.
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Figure 11.— Formality vs. Log-wages

Note: Conditional probability estimates based on a local-constant estimator using an Epanechnikov kernel.
Bandwidth: 0.03.

the minimum will only be due to rescaling induced by unemployment and sector mobility. Thus, by conditioning on values above the minimum, the eﬀects of rescaling
and sector movements should disappear, and the densities should be approximately
the same.
Figures 10, 11, and 12 provide visual evidence of the accuracy of this assumption
within the Brazilian context. Above the minimum wage level, the proportion of workers in the formal sector of the economy does not seem to systematically vary with
the wage. Figure 11 shows that this is also true when we inspect the relationship
between formality and log-wages.44 This evidence supports the assumption that the
underlying latent density of wages should be the same between sectors. The plots of
the empirical CDFs in Figure 12 across formal and informal sectors point in the same
direction: Workers in the formal and informal sectors apparently draw from similar
distributions for wages above the minimum wage. This suggests that the diﬀerences
between the overall distribution of wages occur as a result of the diﬀerent ways in
which the sectors respond to the minimum wage. Note, however, that the assump44

Under Assumption 5 there should be no relationship between formality and any function of the
wage above the minimum wage level.
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Figure 12.— Empirical CDF by Sector above the Minimum Wage

tion required for identiﬁcation is that the entire wage distribution be the same across
sectors. The presence of the minimum wage prevents me from testing this condition
for values below m. Thus, it is still possible that the latent wage distributions are
indeed equal conditional on wages above the minimum wage, while this is not the
case for values below it. This last part of the identifying assumption is untestable.
The evidence that the wage distributions are similar for values above the minimum
wage seems to indicate that they may also be so for values below m in the absence
of the policy. However, this conclusion is subject to debate.
Table VIII shows the estimates of the elasticity of formality with respect to the wage
based on a linear probability model, using diﬀerent restrictions on the sample. The
relationship between sector distribution and wages becomes substantially weaker after
one conditions the regression to only consider wages above the minimum. Regarding
the coeﬃcient while conditioning on higher values, several estimates that are not
diﬀerent from zero were found.
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TABLE VIII
Formality vs. Wages - Linear Regression Estimates
2001

2002

2003

2004

2005

2006

2007

2008

2009

W >0

1.93***
(0.14)

2.15***
(0.14)

2.77***
(0.13)

2.43***
(0.34)

2.73***
(0.15)

2.63***
(0.62)

2.76***
(0.15)

2.51***
(0.48)

0.72
(0.59)

W >m

0.87***
(0.08)

0.71***
(0.08)

0.99***
(0.07)

0.79***
(0.12)

0.54***
(0.08)

0.61***
(0.15)

0.73***
(0.08)

0.51***
(0.11)

0.09
(0.16)

W > 1.5m

0.40***
(0.06)

0.26***
(0.07)

0.42***
(0.06)

0.38***
(0.07)

0.12*
(0.07)

0.15**
(0.06)

0.17**
(0.07)

0.02
(0.06)

-0.03
(0.08)

W > 2m

0.15**
(0.06)

0.07
(0.06)

0.34***
(0.06)

0.08
(0.05)

-0.07
(0.07)

0.07
(0.06)

0.08
(0.07)

-0.05
(0.07)

-0.08*
(0.04)

Note: Estimates of the (100 times the) elasticity of formality with respect to the wage at the minimum wage level,
using diﬀerent sample restrictions. Standard errors in parentheses.

Another maintained assumption of the model is that the latent wage density is
continuous around the minimum. If the wage density is continuous, then my estimates
should not reveal any eﬀect for values other than the minimum wage.
Table IX displays the estimates of the ratio of the left and right limits of the
wage density for values diﬀerent than the minimum wage pooling data from all years
(normalizing the minimum wage to zero). I display the point estimates for using two
values for the bandwidth: the same bandwidth as in Table IV and a bandwidth half of
its size. I perform the placebo test at 20 diﬀerent points, from R$200 to R$300 above
the minimum wage. The point estimates tend to be around one, which should be the
case in the absence of a discontinuity. Using the baseline bandwidth, the estimates
range from 0.88 to 1.17.
However, the null hypothesis of no gap is still rejected at several points. Discontinuities of such small magnitude are likely a result of “heaping” at round numbers. If a
discontinuity of similar size is present in the latent wage density, then the magnitude
of the bias on the estimates of the model structural parameters would be of negligible economic signiﬁcance. All the qualitative implications of the model parameter
estimates based on the continuity assumption would remain valid.45
45

I discuss in Appendix E.3 the consequences of estimating the model incorrectly assuming continuity for the latent wage distribution. The estimators of the probabilities of non-compliance and
“clustering” at the minimum wage will be inconsistent if the latent wage distribution is discontinuous
at the minimum wage level. The ratio between the true structural parameters and the (probability
limit of the) estimators will be given by the magnitude of the discontinuity in the latent density
at the minimum wage level. For example, adjusting the estimates for a discontinuity of 0.92 in the
latent density increases the estimate of πd for the year 2001 from 0.20 to 0.22. Similarly, πm increases
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TABLE IX
Placebo Tests: Discontinuity Estimates using Values Other than the Minimum
Wage
Wage
Baseline
200

10
20
30
40
1.007*** 0.929*** 0.993*** 1.111***
(0.008)

Half

(0.011)
Baseline
300
Half

(0.008)

(0.008)

(0.009)

1.039*** 0.876*** 1.003*** 1.191***
(0.011)

(0.010)

(0.013)

50
60
70
80
90
1.130*** 1.173*** 1.097*** 0.920*** 0.961***
(0.009)

(0.009)

(0.007)

(0.007)

(0.007)

1.178*** 1.161*** 0.969*** 0.654*** 0.742***
(0.015)

(0.014)

(0.010)

(0.008)

(0.009)

100
0.882***
(0.007)
0.579***
(0.010)

1.029*** 0.907*** 0.894*** 1.076***

1.084*** 1.104*** 1.046*** 0.899*** 1.059***

0.995***

(0.008)
(0.008)
(0.008)
(0.009)
0.901*** 0.698*** 0.737*** 1.081***

(0.009)
(0.009)
(0.010)
(0.009)
(0.011)
1.101*** 1.174*** 1.031*** 0.760*** 1.023***

(0.010)
0.865***

(0.013)

(0.011)

(0.010)

(0.012)

(0.013)

(0.013)

(0.012)

(0.010)

(0.013)

(0.013)

Note: Standard errors in parentheses.

As a robustness check, I investigate the sensitivity of my estimates to the choice of
bandwidth and the presence of spillovers. A key parameter of the model, πd , is identiﬁed by the ratio of the wage density above and below the minimum wage. In the
baseline speciﬁcation, the estimation was performed using local linear density estimators with the bandwidth equal to eight times Silverman’s rule of thumb. I estimate πd
using the automatic bandwidth selection procedure proposed by McCrary (2008). The
estimates of πd , available through request, range from 11 to 16%, whereas with the
baseline bandwidth they range from 11 to 23%. Thus, I tend to ﬁnd slightly smaller
estimates of the likelihood of non-compliance using the automatic bandwidth selection
procedure. The qualitative implications of the results, however, remain similar.
In Appendix E.5, I discuss the identiﬁcation of the eﬀect of the minimum wage
on the size of the formal sector under the presence of spillovers. Identiﬁcation of the
latent size of the formal sector can be achieved by assuming that spillovers vanish
at a point higher up in the wage distribution. My spillover-robust estimates of the
impact of the minimum wage on the size of the formal sector are approximately -14%.
Thus, these estimates are higher than the baseline estimates from Table IV that are
obtained under the assumption of absence of spillovers. This suggests that the -9%
eﬀect from the baseline estimate underestimates of the true eﬀect of the minimum
wage on the size of the formal sector if Assumption 3 is violated.
from 0.26 to 0.28.
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7. CONCLUSION
This paper develops a dual-economy model to analyze the eﬀects of the minimum
wage in a country with a large informal sector. I discuss the conditions under which
the eﬀects of the policy are identiﬁed using only cross-sectional data on wages and
sector (deﬁned by formality status) and the same level of the policy is applied to all
workers. I show that the discontinuity of the wage density at the minimum wage level
identiﬁes the probability of non-compliance with the policy, and the latent relationship
between sector and wages can be recovered using data on wages and sector above the
minimum wage. I then show that the latent joint distribution of sector and wages
can be identiﬁed based solely on data on sector and wages. This result allows me to
estimate the impact of the policy on a broad range of labor market outcomes, such
as expected wages, unemployment, wage inequality, the size of the formal sector, and
labor tax revenues.
The main results are that the minimum wage signiﬁcantly alters the shape of the
lower part of the wage distribution and thereby reduces wage inequality. My estimates
show that expected wages increase by approximately 16% and the Gini coeﬃcient decreases by approximately 24%. However, the minimum wage policy generates sizable
unemployment eﬀects and a reduction in the size of the formal sector of the economy.
My estimates imply a decrease of approximately 9% in the size of the formal sector.
This result is due to both unemployment eﬀects on the formal sector and movements
of workers from the formal sector to the informal sector as a consequence of the
policy. My estimates also indicate that the latent size of the formal sector is approximately four times larger than the informal sector. Thus, small movements from the
formal to the informal sector still induce a sizable change in the relative size of the
informal sector. My estimates show that the minimum wage increases the size of the
informal sector by approximately 39%. Together, these eﬀects imply a reduction in
the tax revenues collected by the government to support the social welfare system of
approximately 6%.
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The research design based on the sharp contrast in the eﬀects of the minimum wage
between workers on each side of the minimum wage value allows for indirect tests of
the underlying identiﬁcation assumptions of the model. The graphical and statistical evidence supports the maintained assumptions. The robustness checks performed
produced similar results to those of the baseline estimator.
There are, however, several limitations of this strategy. A fully structural model of
workers and ﬁrms behavior is not speciﬁed. Thus, this approach does not recover deep
parameters of the economy such as the elasticity of labor demand.46 An extended
version of the dual-economy model presented in this paper that fully incorporate
optimizing behavior from the workers’ side, such as a Roy-model of sector choice, is
the object of ongoing research.
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ESTIMATING THE EFFECTS OF THE MINIMUM WAGE IN A DEVELOPING
COUNTRY: A DENSITY DISCONTINUITY DESIGN APPROACH, SUPPLEMENTAL
MATERIAL

APPENDIX A: IDENTIFICATION

This section I prove identiﬁcation of the parameters of the model and the joint
distribution of latent sector and wages under the assumptions of the Dual-Economy
model. In what follows, assume that the econometrician observes a random sample
of the pair {(Wi (1), Si (1))} of size N from a population of interest. I also assume the
following easily veriﬁable technical conditions: the minimum wage m is set at a point
with non-zero density, that is, f0 (m) > 0, P r[W (1) < m] > 0, and Λ0 (m; β) 6= 0.
Lemma A.1 (Identiﬁcation of sector-speciﬁc parameters) Under Assumptions 1, 2, 3, and 4, π is identiﬁed.
Lemma A.2 (Identiﬁcation of latent distributions) Under Assumptions 1, 2,
3 and 4, the latent joint distribution of sector and wages is identiﬁed.
Proof: Given Assumptions 3 and 4, the relationship between the observed density
and the latent one can be written as:

(1)

f (w) =

⎧
⎪
⎪
⎪
⎨
⎪
⎪
⎪
⎩

πd (w)f0 (w)
c
R m πm (w)f0 (w)
dw
c
f0 (w)
c

if w < m
if w = m
if w > m.

Given Assumptions 2, 3 and 4, the latent share of the formal sector Λ(w(0))
is identiﬁed using the information above the minimum wage. This is true because
1

2
P r[S(0) = 1|W (0) = w] = P r[S(1) = 1|W (1) = w] when w > m. Then, we have:
∞

Z

(P r[S(1) = 1|W (1) = u] − Λ(u; β))2 f (u|W (1) > m)du.

β0 = arg min
β

m

Furthermore, we have that Λ(w; β0 ) = P r[S(0) = 1|W (0) = w] for all w.1 Given
Assumptions 1, 3 and 4, we have:
πd (m) = lim→0+

f (m − )
.
f (m + )

Moreover, regarding the derivative of the wage density, we have:

(2)

0

f (w) =

⎧
⎨
⎩

πd0 (w)f0 (w)
π (w)f 0 (w)
+ d c0
c
f00 (w)
c

if w < m
if w > m.

Then, it can be shown that:
πd0 (m)


= lim→0+

f 0 (m − ) f (m − )
−
f 0 (m + ) f (m + )


·

f 0 (m + )
.
f (m + )

Because the RHS of this equation contains only objects of the observed wage distribution, this implies that πd0 (m) is identiﬁed. Given that the function Λ(m) is identiﬁed,
we have:
(0)

πd = πd (m) −
(1)

Λ(m)
· πd0 (m)
0
Λ (m)
(0)

πd = [πd (m) − (1 − Λ(m)) · πd ] · Λ(m)−1 .
This can be shown using the equation below and its derivative with respect to the
1

Note the importance of all w in this sentence. This means that once we recover β0 , we can
forecast P r[S(0) = 1|W (0) = w] for values of w that are below the minimum wage level. It should
be clear here why non-parametric estimation of the conditional probability of sector given the wage
is not an option. By assuming a parametric form, I can use the parameters to predict the latent
probability of sector given the wage for values at which, in the data, this probability is equal to zero
due to the minimum wage policy.
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wage:
(1)

(0)

πd (w) = πd Λ(w) + πd (1 − Λ(w)).
Given that all terms of the equation above are identiﬁed, we have that the function
πd (w) is identiﬁed. Inverting the relationship between the observed and latent wage
densities, we have:

(3)

f0 (w) =

⎧
⎨

f (w)·c
πd (w)

if w < m

⎩ f (w) · c if w > m.

Which implies:
Z
c=[

m

f (w)
dw + 1 − F (m)]−1 .
πd (w)

Because the function πd (w) is already identiﬁed and F (m) is simply the fraction
of workers in the observed wage distribution who earn less than or equal to the
minimum wage, c is identiﬁed. This implies the identiﬁcation of the entire latent
wage distribution f0 (w). Using the latent wage density and the function Λ(w) allows
the identiﬁcation of the latent densities of the formal and informal sectors and, ﬁnally,
(1)

(1)

the remaining parameters πm and πu .

f (W (0) = w|S(0) = 1) =

P r[S(0)=1|W (0)=w]·f0 (w)
P r[S(0)=1]
P r[S(0)=0|W (0)=w]·f0 (w)
P r[S(0)=0]
P r[W (1)=m|S(1)=1]
0 (m|S(0)=1)
· 1−F
1−P r[W (1)=m|S(1)=1)]
F0 (m|S(0)=1)
(1)
(1)
1 − πd − πm

f (W (0)|S(0) = 0)

=

(1)
πm

=

(1)

=

(0)

= 1 − πd .

πu

πm

=
=

R Λ(w)·f0 (w)
Λ(u)f0 (u)du
(1−Λ(w))·f
0 (w)
R
(1−Λ(u))f0 (u)du

(0)

Q.E.D.

4
It is important to note that the identiﬁcation result holds if one assumes that
(1)

(1)

(1)

πm and πu are non-speciﬁed functions of the latent wage, as long as πd

remains

constant. In this scenario, the parameters recovered above are expectations - E(πd1 )
(1)

and E(πu ) - over the distribution of workers whose latent wages are below the
(1)

minimum wage. Formally, the parameters identiﬁed are πm = P r[W (1) = m|S(0) =
(1)

1, W (0) < m] and πu = P r[W (1) = .|S(0) = 1, W (0) < m]. Under the maintained
assumptions, this probability is the same for all workers regardless of their latent
wage. In the case in which workers are heterogeneous in the probability of becoming
unemployed, or receiving the minimum wage, with respect to their latent wages,
the model recovers the natural extension of this parameter in the presence of such
heterogeneity. That is, it recovers the average eﬀect for the population of aﬀected
workers. Interestingly, this does not imply that the latent wage distributions obtained
under the assumption of constant probabilities will be inconsistent. The assumption
of constant probabilities is maintained only to simplify the exposition.2
Further, it should be stressed that this proof does not require the wage distribution
to peak above the minimum wage. In fact, one can identify the eﬀects of the minimum
wage regardless of where in the latent wage distribution the minimum wage happens
to be set, as long as the density of wages is greater than zero at the minimum wage,
(1)

(0)

πd and πd are constants and either one of them is greater than zero.

Corollary A.3 (Identiﬁcation of the minimum wage treatment eﬀects)
Under Assumptions 1, 2, 3 and 4, the eﬀects of the minimum wage on functionals of
the joint distribution of sector and wages are identiﬁed.
Proof: The identiﬁcation of treatment eﬀect parameters follows directly from the
identiﬁcation of the joint distribution of observed and latent sector and wages from
i.i.d data on {(Wi (1), Si (1))}.
2

Q.E.D.

This will hold as long as the part regarding the probability of non-compliance is correctly speciﬁed
with respect to latent wages – for example, if it is constant. See more on this in Appendix 3.
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APPENDIX B: IDENTIFICATION UNDER INDEPENDENCE BETWEEN SECTOR AND
WAGES

In this section, I discuss the identiﬁcation given the independence between (latent)
sector and wages, that is, P r[S(0) = 1|W (0) = w] = Λ ∀ w. I maintain Assumptions 1 (continuity), 3 (no spillovers) and 4 (minimum wage eﬀects). Given those
assumptions, the aggregate wage density will be given by:

(4)

f (w) =

⎧
⎪
⎪
⎪
⎨
⎪
⎪
⎪
⎩

πd f0 (w)
c
πm F0 (m)
c
f0 (w)
c

if w < m
if w = m
if w > m.

This is exactly the one-sector version of this model, as proposed by Doyle (2006).
This means that at least the aggregate parameters πd , πm and πu are identiﬁed as:
πd = lim→0

f (m − )
.
f (m + )

To identify πm , one simply needs to verify that:
πm = πd ·

P r[W (1) = m]
.
P r[W (1) < m]

Given πd , F0 (m) can identiﬁed by:
F0 (m) =

3

3

P r[W (1) < m]
.
πd P r[W (1) > m] + P r[W (1) < m]

See the section on the identiﬁcation of Doyle’s model.

6
The relationship between the aggregate data parameters πd and πm and the sectorspeciﬁc model parameters can be derived as:
(1)

(0)

πd = Λπd + (1 − Λ)πd

(1)
(0)
πm = Λπm
+ (1 − Λ)πm

πu = Λπu(1)
(1)

(1)
πd + πm
+ πu(1) = 1
(0)

(0)
πd + πm
= 1.

Having recovered the aggregate parameters, the goal is solve for the sector-speciﬁc
parameters. To do so, one ﬁrst needs to identify Λ. Note:
Λ ≡ P r[S(0) = 1] = P r[S(0) = 1|W (0) > m] = P r[S(1) = 1|W (1) > m],
where the ﬁrst equality holds because of the independence between latent sector
and wages, and the second holds due to the lack of spillovers on sector probabilities. Interestingly, the identiﬁcation of the latent size of the formal sector does not
rely on anything but independence, the lack of spillovers, and the assumption that
P r[W (1) > m|W (0) < m] = 0.4 This means that we can correctly identify the size
of the formal sector even if we mis-specify the continuity of the latent distribution of
wages or the way in which that the minimum wage aﬀects the lower tail of the wage
distribution. Note that, given the aggregate data parameters and Λ, this is a system of ﬁve equations and ﬁve unknowns. Unfortunately, the system is rank deﬁcient,
and hence, an additional equation needs to be added to recover the sector-speciﬁc
(1)

parameters. Relying on the identiﬁcation of Λ , πu is identiﬁed by:
πu(1) =

4

πu
1 − πd − πm
=
.
Λ
Λ

P r[W (1) > m|W (0) < m] = 0 is implied by Assumption 4. When Assumption 4 does not hold,
the identiﬁcation strategy described above will be valid if P r[W (1) > m|W (0) < m] = 0. An example
of this situation is when the probability of non-compliance is a function of the worker’s latent wage.
This would invalidate Assumption 4 while preserving the condition P r[W (1) > m|W (0) < m] = 0.
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(1)

To recover πm , it is necessary to consider the density of the formal sector:

(5)

f (w|S(1) = 1) =

⎧
⎪
⎪
⎪
⎨
⎪
⎪
⎪
⎩

0

if w < m

(1)
πm F0 (m)
c(1)

if w = m

f0 (w)
c(1)

if w > m,

(1)

where c(1) = 1−F0 (m)(1−πm ) is a scaling factor such that the two densities integrate
(1)

to one. The key feature of the formal sector that allows for the identiﬁcation of πm

is that because the density is zero below the minimum wage, the scaling factor on
the denominator is a function of only one unknown parameter (note that F0 (m) is
already identiﬁed). Finally, using:
(1)
F0 (m)/c(1) ,
P r[W (1) = m|S(1) = 1] = πm

it is possible to show that:
(1)
=
πm

P r[W (1) = m|S(1) = 1]
1 − F0 (m)
·
.
1 − P r[W (1) = m|S(1) = 1]
F0 (m)

The RHS of this equation consists only of quantities that are already identiﬁed. Given
(1)

that πm is identiﬁed based on the expression above, we can now return to the system
and recover all the other parameters:
(1)

(0)
=
πm

πm − Λπm
.
1−Λ

Thus:
(0)

(0)
πd = 1 − π m
.

8
Finally:
(1)

(1)
πd = 1 − π m
− πu(1) .

The latent wage density can be recovered in the same way as in the baseline model,
that is, by inverting the relationship and using the fact that c and πd were already
identiﬁed:

(6)

f0 (w) =

⎧
⎨

f (w)·c
πd

if w < m

⎩ f (w) · c if w > m.

This implies that we have identiﬁed the latent distribution of wages f0 (w), the latent
size of the formal sector Λ and the parameters π that govern how the minimum wage
aﬀects the economy.
Note that estimation in this context is considerably easier than in the baseline
model. This is the case because it is not necessary to estimate the derivative of the
density of wages at m to solve for the sector-speciﬁc parameters. All objects in the
identifying equations – except by the lateral limit of the density of wages at m – can be
estimated by replacing the population object with its respective sample counterpart.
I used this plug-in method to estimate the parameters of the model in the empirical
application.
APPENDIX C: ESTIMATION
C.1.

Local Linear Density Estimation

In this section, I describe the local linear approach to density estimation. A standard approach to non-parametrically estimate densities at boundary points is to use
a local linear density estimator. This estimator builds on the idea of local linear conditional mean estimators. It begins by dividing the support of the density into a set
of bins. Thereafter, a “response variable” is deﬁned as the bin counts of these disjoint
intervals. After this process, one is left with a vector containing the “independent
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variable,” which is the bin center, and a corresponding “dependent variable,” the bin
counts. Finally, standard local polynomial smoothing estimates are applied to these
constructed variables. The discussion and notation here will follow the approach advocated by McCrary (2008) in the context of testing for manipulation in RD designs.
To begin, deﬁne g(wi ) as the discretized version of the wage support for a bin size
equal to b.

⎧
⎨ b w−m cb + b + m if w 6= m
b
2
g(w) =
⎩
m
if w = m,
where bac is the greatest integer in a.5 Clearly, it holds that g(w) ∈ χ ≡ {..., m −
5 2b , m − 3 2b , m − 2b , m, m + 2b , m + 3 2b , m + 5 2b , ...}. I will call the jth element of this set
P
Xj . 6 Deﬁne the normalized cell size for the jth bin Yj = N1b N
i=1 1I{g(Wi ) = Xj } .
Let K(.) be a symmetric kernel function satisfying the usual properties and let h be
a bandwidth satisfying the conditions h → 0 , nh → ∞, (nh)1/2 h2 → 0 and b/h → 0
. Then, the local linear estimator of the density and its derivative are deﬁned, for
w 6= m, as:

⎡

fb(w)

⎤

⎣
⎦ = arg min(a ,a )0
0 1
fb0 (w)

PJ
j

(Yj − a0 − a1 (Xj − w))2 K(

wj −w
)(1I{Xj
h

> m}1I{w > m} + 1I{Xj < m}1I{w < m}).

APPENDIX D: TESTING

This research design allows us to perform partial tests of the validity of the model’s
assumptions. This section I describe how these tests can be performed and their
limitations.
Assumption 1, the continuity of the latent wage distribution, can be veriﬁed by
5

As discussed by McCrary, the greatest integer in a is the unique integer Q such that Q < a < Q+1
(round to the left). In software, this is known as the “ﬂoor” function.
6
As discussed in McCrary (2008), the endpoints X1 and Xj may always be chosen arbitrarily
small (large) such that all points in the support of the distribution of wages are inside one of the
bins.
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visual inspection of the histogram and the kernel density estimates using diﬀerent
values for the bandwidth. Formally, this condition can be tested by performing a
placebo test, that is, by checking whether there are diﬀerences between the left and
right limits of the density estimates at wage points other than the minimum wage.
Assumption 2 can be tested by comparing the ﬁt of the parametric model with nonparametric smoothing estimates. If Λ(w; β) is correctly speciﬁed, for the true value
of the parameters β0 , we have:

Z

∞

�

2
P r[S(0) = 1|W (0) = u] − Λ(u; β0 ) f0 (u)du = 0.

m

While this equation is in terms of latent variables, we can restate it using observables
by relying on Assumption 3. Thus, we have:
Z

∞

I≡

�

2
P r[S(1) = 1|W (1) = u] − Λ(u; β0 ) 1I{u > m}f (u)du = 0,

m

where β0 ≡ arg minβ E[(Si (1) − Λ(Wi (1); β))2 1I{Wi (1) > m}]. This condition is in
terms of quantities we can observe. Correctness of the speciﬁcation of the model
for Λ(W (0), β) implies that I = 0. This is a integrated mean squared error type of
condition that can be used for speciﬁcation testing (see Pagan and Ullah (1999)).
The idea behind it is to compare the ﬁt of a parametric model with the ﬁt of a
non-parametric model. This type of comparison can be used to identify the proper
functional form for the sector-wage relationship. This is relevant because part of the
identiﬁcation relies on extrapolating this conditional mean function to values below
the minimum wage.7 It should be noted, however, that this is, at best, a partial test of
7

There are also parametric versions of these tests. For example, testing Assumption 2 in a parametric setting can be achieved by increasing the order of the polynomial of the wage and testing
the restriction that the higher order terms are equal to zero. In the simplest case in which one has
a linear logit of the sector given the wage, the correctness of the speciﬁcation can be tested by
estimating a model in which the square of the wage is added as a regressor and assessing whether
the coeﬃcient associated with the squared term is diﬀerent from zero.
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the assumption. There are some deviations from the null for which this test does not
have the power to reject. To make this point clear, observe the following condition:

∞

Z

�

2
P r[S(0) = 1|W (0) = u] − Λ(u; β0 ) f0 (u)du = 0.

−∞

This condition is equivalent to the correctness of the speciﬁcation of the parametric
model for the conditional probability of the latent sector given the wage. The crucial
diﬀerence between this condition and that used in the test above is that it can detect
when the model is incorrectly speciﬁed for values below the minimum wage. Unfortunately, it is not possible to create a feasible version of this condition, as once we move
from latent to observed wages, all information on the conditional probability of latent
sector given the wages is lost for values below the minimum. In sum, it is conceivable
that the parametric functional form holds for values above the minimum wage but
fails to hold for values below it. This part of the assumption remains untestable.
It is also possible to test Assumption 4. In Assumption 4, the probabilities that
capture the eﬀects of the minimum wage are deﬁned. A restriction imposed by that
(1)

assumption is that the probabilities of non-compliance (πd

(0)

and πd ) are invariant

across workers with diﬀerent latent wages in the same sector.8 This is a restrictive
assumption, as workers whose latent wage is close to the minimum wage level could
be more likely to comply with the policy than workers whose latent wage is far from
the minimum. To see why this assumption is testable, one must ﬁrst examine the
second derivative of the observed wage density:

(7)

00

f (w) =

⎧
⎨
⎩

8

00 (w)f (w)
πn
c

0

0

(w)
+ 2 πn (w)f
+
c
f 00 (w)
c

πd (w)f 00 (w)
c

if w < m
if w > m.

One can see that in aggregate, the likelihood of non-compliance πd (w) will be a function of latent
wages due to changes in the composition of each sector as we move along diﬀerent wages.

12
If the continuity assumption on the latent wage distribution is strengthened up to
the second derivative, that is, if limw→m+ f000 (w) = limw→m− f000 (w), then we have:


cf 00 (m − ) − πd00 (m)f0 (m) − 2πd0 (m)f00 (m) 
= 0.
lim→0+ cf 00 (m + ) −
πd (m)
Intuitively, we can test Assumption 4 because by examining the second derivative, we
have added another equation while the number of parameters remained the same. This
provides us the overidentiﬁcation condition that allows us to test the model.9,10,11
APPENDIX E: ROBUSTNESS

This section demonstrates how generalizable the inferences based on the model are
when the model is misspeciﬁed or when we fail to obtain data on other determinants
of the joint distribution of sector and wages. I claim that (i) the model is still correctly
speciﬁed if the unobserved heterogeneity aﬀects either the model parameters or the
latent wage distribution, but not both, (ii) the model correctly identiﬁes the desired
features of the data when the model parameters are allowed to vary across latent wages
and individuals under some restrictions on the unobserved heterogeneity, (iii) the odds
ratio of clustering at the minimum wage (πm ) versus non-compliance (πd ), and the
9
This is easier to see in the case in which one assumes a linear probability model for P r[S(0) =
1|W (0)]. In this scenario, it is possible to ﬁnd a closed-form solution for the model parameters using
either the ﬁrst or the second derivative of the wage density. These diﬀerent ways of identifying
the parameters must yield the same result if the model is correctly speciﬁed. However they do not
coincide if the model is misspeciﬁed, that is, when the probabilities of non-compliance are functions
of latent wages.
10
If one is willing to impose further smoothing conditions on the latent wage distribution, it
is possible to identify the model by imposing ﬂexible conditions on the relationship between the
(1)
(0)
parameters and the wages. For example, if one believes that (πd , πd ) is appropriately described
by a quadratic (cubic) function, then one needs to go up to the third (fourth) derivative of the wage
density to estimate the model parameters.
11
This condition is easier to test in the parametric version of the model. To do so, one simply
(1)
needs to estimate a version of the model in which the probabilities of non-compliance πd and πd (0)
are allowed to be a low-order polynomial of the latent wages and compute a likelihood ratio test that
uses the baseline version of the model as a comparison. A rejection of the null indicates that the more
general version is a better description of the economy, that is, the probabilities of non-compliance
are indeed functions of latent wages.
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latent share of the formal sector are correctly identiﬁed even when unemployment
eﬀects cannot be, and (iv) the aggregate parameters πd , πm and πu are correctly
identiﬁed even when Assumption 2 does not hold or when unemployment eﬀects are
also present in the informal sector.

To show (i), I reformulate the model and allow its parameters or distributions to be
functions of potentially unobservable worker characteristics. I show that under some
conditions, the assumptions I require for the baseline model to hold will still be valid.
(ii) I reformulate the model under a random coeﬃcients framework. I show that under
reasonable conditions for the heterogeneity of the parameters across individuals, the
estimands based on the baseline model identify the expectation of the distribution of
parameters over the set of workers aﬀected by the minimum wage. To show (iii), I
prove that a lack of continuity implies the inconsistency of some, but not all, of the
parameters of interest in the model. To show (iv), I recall that identiﬁcation of Doyle’s
aggregate parameters does not rely on all four assumptions that I use to identify the
baseline model.

These results reveal an important feature of the baseline model. It is easy and
feasible to infer the direction that the parameter estimates will go when some of the
model’s assumptions are violated. Moreover, as the identiﬁcation is achieved using
“separable” pieces – a model for the conditional distribution of sector given the wages,
continuity of latent wage distribution to identify πd , and so forth – some of the
results will still hold when the model is partially misspeciﬁed. Taken together, these
features should increase the credibility of the results when there are some concerns
with the correctness of the model speciﬁcation. Some pieces of information based on
this approach can be useful even in the worst case scenario in which the model is
guaranteed to be inconsistent for some parameters.

14
E.1.

Role of Covariates and Unobserved Heterogeneity

By exploring the diﬀerent eﬀects of the minimum wage across sectors and the discontinuity of the density of wages around the minimum, one can estimate how the
economy responds to this policy. This approach has some similarities to the quasiexperimental Regression Discontinuity Designs. Because one of the main advantages
of Regression Discontinuity Designs is to provide a way to avoid most of the endogeneity concerns associated with using observational data to infer causality, it is useful to
discuss the extent to which these advantages are also present in this method.
Assume that there is a random variable Z – say, for example, age – that is known
to aﬀect individual labor market conditions. One example is when workers with different values of Z draw from diﬀerent latent wage distributions. Another way that
Z can aﬀect a worker’s labor market conditions is through the model parameters.
For example, after the introduction of the minimum wage, younger workers might be
more likely to move into the informal sector than older workers, which, in the model,
(1)

would be represented by a higher πd . In these cases, is it necessary to estimate the
model conditional on Z for the inferences to be valid?
In the following discussion, I will always assume continuity of the Z-speciﬁc latent
wage distribution, an absence of spillovers and a covariate-speciﬁc version of the
assumption that describes the minimum wage eﬀects. I will also assume the following:
Assumption 1

Conditional probability of latent sector given the wage:

Z
P r[S(0) = 1|W (0) = w] ≡

P r[S(0) = 1|W (0) = w, Z = z]f (z|w)dz = Λ(w; β).

This assumption simply means that whatever the model for the conditional probability of the sector given the wage and Z is, this model can be aggregated to a
unconditional one with parameters β.12 Two suﬃcient conditions for the inferences
12

In general, this model will be more complex than the covariate-speciﬁc one. A simple, suﬃcient,
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based on the unconditional wage distribution to be valid in the presence of covariates
are the following:
Case 1:
Assumption 2

Equality of parameters: π(z) = π ∀z.

When the eﬀect of Z occurs through changes in the latent joint distribution of
sector and wages but not through diﬀerential responses to the minimum wage, then
Z can be safely ignored when making inferences with regard to the unconditional
distribution. The reason for this result is simple. The assumptions above imply that
all assumptions of the model for the aggregated data remain valid.
Case 2:
Assumption 3

Equality of latent distributions: W (0)|Z ∼F ∀z.

This assumption means that P r[W (0) < w|Z = z] = P r[W (0) < w|Z = z 0 ] for all
(z, z 0 ) and all w. By restricting the latent wage distribution to be the same for all
values of z, inference based on the unconditional distribution ignoring the covariate
will be valid when parameters are allowed to vary over Z. The parameters π recovered
from the aggregate data will be weighted averages of the covariate-speciﬁc ones, with
correct weights to reﬂect the share of each group of values of Z in the population.
These, of course, are much stronger conditions than those in Case 1, as the role of
covariates is severely limited when they are only allowed to determine wages through
the diﬀerences in minimum wage eﬀects.
When both the latent wage distribution and the parameters are allowed to vary over
Z, the estimate of πd can be interpreted as a local eﬀect, as it recovers the likelihood
of non-compliance for those with latent wages around the minimum wage.13
but clearly not necessary, condition to guarantee that such a model will exist is when strengthened to
P r[S(0) = 1|W (0) = w, Z = z] = Λ(w, β), that is, covariates only enter the conditional probability
of sector given the wage though their eﬀects on wages.
13
Preliminary results from simulations show that an unreasonably large degree of heterogeneity
in both the latent distributions and the model parameters is necessary for the inference based on
unconditional distribution to show sizable distortions.
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The relevance of these results is quite small if the wage determinants are observable,
as the model can be easily estimated conditional on these variables. If the estimation
is performed while conditioning on the covariates, one need not be concerned with the
cases above, meaning that the model parameters and latent joint distributions can
be diﬀerent for diﬀerent values of Z. However, the situation diﬀers when not all wage
determinants are observable. Failure to observe wage determinants is a major source
of bias in inferences based on regression models. In this design, this is not the case, as
long as the model parameters remain constant over the distribution of the variables
that are ignored, which seems to be a much easier condition to satisfy than the zero
correlation usually assumed in regression models. In this sense, this research design
resembles most of the characteristics of Regression Discontinuity Designs, overcoming
the diﬃculties in assessing causal eﬀects based on observational data due to endogeneity concerns. The reason for this is that the identiﬁcation does not rely on variation
in the minimum wage to assess the policy’s impact. Instead, identiﬁcation relies on
the sharp contrast between the eﬀect of the minimum wage across individuals whose
wages would fall on each side of it. Thus, concerns with omitted variable biases should
be much more limited.

E.2.

Random Coeﬃcients

In the model, a worker is characterized by a pair (Wi , Si ) of observed sector and wage, a vector (Wi (0), Si (0), ζi ), and a vector (π(ζ)
(1)

(1)

(1)

(0)

≡

(0)

(πn (ζ), πm (ζ), πu (ζ), πn (ζ), πm (ζ)), which is now ζ-speciﬁc. One way to interpret this is that we are treating ζ as the worker’s unobserved type. For now, I will not
assume anything regarding the relationship between the worker’s type and his latent
(0

(0)

wages. Of course, it still holds that πm (ζ) + πn (ζ) = 1 for all ζ and similarly for the
formal sector parameters. This means, in addition to the worker’s latent sector and
wages, he receives a draw for the model parameters. Here, I also allow this draw to
be a function of the latent wage. Thus, for example, workers with higher latent wages
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can have a higher probability of receiving the minimum wage versus becoming unemployed. This extension captures the idea that (i) minimum wage eﬀects might vary
across dimensions of worker’s characteristics that are unobservable to the researcher
and (ii) minimum wage eﬀects can, and likely will, vary across workers with respect
to the distance of their latent productivities from the minimum wage level. The rest
of the model remains the same, meaning that I will retain continuity and the absence
of spillovers. I will also assume independence between latent sector and wages for
simplicity in the rest of this discussion.
This extension adds a great degree of ﬂexibility to the model. It relaxes Assumption
4 in two ways. It allows diﬀerent workers with similar wages to have diﬀerent minimum wage response probabilities in an unknown and unspeciﬁed way. It also allows
workers in the formal sector to have diﬀerent probabilities of becoming unemployed
(1)

(1)

(πu ) versus truncating at the minimum wage (πm )) for diﬀerent values of the latent
wage. Importantly, this can be achieved without relying on any speciﬁed functional
form; that is, it is not assumed that these probabilities vary over latent wages in any
parametric, continuous or known way.
To analyze the model, we now need to deﬁne some new objects. Let:

(1)
(ζ|w))
E(πm

Z
=

(1)
πm
(u)fζ|w (u)du.

This expression deﬁnes the “average probability of truncation at the minimum wage
for a formal sector worker with latent wage equal to w” as the integral of this probability for each worker’s unobserved type weighted by the proportion of each type for
that wage value. We can analogously deﬁne similar objects for the other probabilities.
Now, under this new set of assumptions, the relationship between latent and observed densities will be given by:

18

f (w) =

⎧
⎪
⎪
⎪
⎨
⎪
⎪
⎪
⎩

E(πd (ζ|W (0)=w)f0 (w)
c
Rm
E(πm (ζ)|W (0)=u)f0 (u)du
c
f0 (w)
c

if w < m
if w = m
if w > m.

Now, let us consider the behavior of the estimands deﬁned for the baseline model
used under this, more general, version.

πd ≡ lim→0

f (m − )
.
f (m + )

It is easy to see that:

lim→0

f (m − )
(1)
(0)
= ΛE(πd (ζ|W (0) = m, S(0) = 1)+(1−Λ)E(πd (ζ)|W (0) = m, S(0) = 0).
f (m + )

Now, it is also easy to see that this estimand will converge to the number that
(1)

(1)

we need if E(πd (ζ|W (0) = w, S(0) = 1) = E(πd (ζ|W = w0 , S(0) = 1) and
(0)

(0)

E(πd (ζ)|W (0) = w, S(0) = 0) = E(πd (ζ)|W (0) = w0 , S(0) = 0). This means
that the only restriction on the relationship between the types and latent wages is
that the expectation of the non-compliance probabilities (taken with respect to the
type distribution) is not a function of the wage.

14

Assuming that this condition holds, we have that our baseline estimand
identiﬁes the expected value of πd over the population of aﬀected indilim→0 ff (m−)
(m+)
viduals. That is:
14

This does not mean that the model is unidentiﬁed if this condition fails to hold. It means that
in this case, we would need to rely on the derivatives of the wage density to identify the slope of the
relationship between expected minimum wage probabilities and latent wages. This can be achieved
in the same way as discussed in the testing section.
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f (m − )
= P r[W (1) = W (0)|W (0) < m].
f (m + )

Regarding the estimand of πm :
πm ≡ πd

P r[Wi = m]
.
P r[Wi < m]

It can be shown that:
P r[Wi = m]
=
πd
P r[Wi < m]

Rm

E(πm (ζ)|W (0) = u)f0 (u)du
Rm
= P r[W (1) = m|W (0) < m],
f0 (u)du

which means that πm converges to the expectation of the parameter over the population of aﬀected workers. The intuition for this result is that the estimand of πm comes
from the point mass at the minimum wage level, which is obtained by integrating the
probability of “clustering” at the minimum wage level for all workers whose latent
wages are below the minimum wage level. Thus, irrespective of what functional form
exists between the latent wage and the probability of receiving the minimum wage,
this form simply reveals itself in the data in the form of the proportion of workers at
the minimum wage level. The mass of wages at the minimum wage level has already
“integrated out” the unobserved heterogeneity. This allows us to consider estimating
(1)

P r[W (1) = m|W (0) < m] without completely describing the shape of πm (ζ) as a
function of W (0). The term P r[W (1) = m|W (0) < m, S(0) = 1] coincides with the
(1)

(1)

parameter πm as deﬁned in the baseline model when πm is not a function of the latent
(1)

wage. When πm is indeed a function of the latent wage (through unobserved types,
for example), we can bypass the task of modeling this function and directly identify
the aggregate component P r[W (1) = m|W (0) < m, S(0) = 1]. Similar calculations
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show that the same is the case with respect to the estimand of unemployment:
1 − πd − πm = P r[W (1) = .|W (0) < m].
Finally, it can be shown that the estimates for the implied treatment eﬀects and
latent densities will also converge to the correct values. This is a somewhat remarkable
result, as it can be tempting to say that the way in which one understands the
relationship between the heterogeneity in parameters and latent wages will necessarily
determine the estimated latent densities that, in turn, will drive the results for the
treatment eﬀects. This result shows that this intuition is incorrect. As long as the
(0)

(1)

part that concerns the likelihood of non-compliance (πd , πd ) is reasonably speciﬁed,
which can be achieved in a very ﬂexible way by utilizing higher order derivatives of
the wage density, all the results will hold. This result will hold even if unemployment
or truncation at the minimum wage happen to have a unknown pattern that varies
across individuals, unobservable characteristics, or latent wages.

E.3.

15

Lack of Continuity

In the following discussion, I will assume independence between latent sector and
wages. Now suppose that πd is not identiﬁed. This could be the case for two reasons.
The ﬁrst case is when latent wage distribution is not continuous. In this case, the
estimate of πd actually identiﬁes πd κ, where κ is the (unknown) size of the discontinuity of the latent wage around the minimum wage. It is clear that as long as κ = 1,
the estimate of πd will be consistent. The second case is when spillovers are misspeciﬁed. For example, if one incorrectly assumes that spillovers are absent, when in fact
they are present and reduce the density of wages just above the minimum wage,16
15

Of course, the marginal eﬀects estimates will break down, as one needs to know not only the
average probability of truncating at the minimum wage and unemployment but, more important, also
the marginal probability to identify the eﬀect of changes in the minimum wage level. The marginal
probabilities will only be recovered if they either coincide with the average probability, as in the
baseline version of the model, or if they have a known or estimable functional form.
16
This will be the case if one assumes that spillovers are weakly positive.
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πd is misspeciﬁed because the density of wages observed just above the minimum
wage is not the correct quantity to scale the density below to measure the extent of
non-compliance.
However, by using this identiﬁcation strategy, one can compute bounds for the
extent of non-compliance. For example, if spillovers are assumed to be weakly positive,
meaning that workers above the minimum do not suﬀer wage cuts following the policy,
then πd estimated when ignoring spillovers represent an upper bound of the likelihood
of non-compliance. This will also provide an upper bound for πm and a corresponding
lower bound for πu . Importantly, this means that the sizable unemployment eﬀects
found in the application cannot be explained by having a misspeciﬁed model for
spillovers, as unemployment eﬀects will necessarily be magniﬁed in the presence of
spillovers.
Interestingly, some features of the minimum wage eﬀects can still be correctly identiﬁed in this scenario. It is straightforward to see that the odds ratio of truncation
versus non-compliance will still be correctly identiﬁed regardless of the lack of continuity in the latent wage distribution or misspeciﬁcation of spillovers. Moreover, those
quantities will be meaningful even if the correct speciﬁcation for the minimum wage
eﬀects would need a more ﬂexible form for the parameters – by making them vary
across individuals or latent wages, for example. In general, the statistic
will always identify

P r[W (1)=m|W (0)<m]
,
P r[W (1)<m|W (0)<m]

P r[W (1)=m]
P r[W (1)<m]

which is the ratio of the expected likelihood

of truncating at the minimum wage versus not complying with the minimum wage
for those directly aﬀected by the policy.17 . Interestingly, note that the same does not
hold for the ratio of unemployment to either non-compliance or truncation.
If the latent wage distribution present a discontinuity at the minimum wage level,
then this identiﬁcation strategy will identify πd κ. That is, the probability of noncompliance will be scaled by the discontinuity in the latent wage density at m. Thus,
17

The conditions needed for this result are weak, namely, the lack of point mass at the minimum
wage level in the latent wage distribution and a “no-crossing condition” that rules out workers higher
up in the wage distribution receiving the minimum wage or less in the presence of the policy
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if the discontinuity is of moderate size, the implied change in the estimated of πd will
be of a small order.18 Thus, sizable distortions will be present only if the latent wage
distribution presents large discontinuities at the minimum wage level.
It should also be stressed that under independence between sector and wages, the
latent share of the formal sector – which is perhaps one of the most relevant parameters of the model – is still identiﬁed regardless of misspecifying how the minimum
wage aﬀects the lower part of the wage distribution or a lack of continuity in the
latent wage distribution.19

E.4.

Aggregate Parameters

Doyle (2006) and Meyer and Wise (1983) deﬁne what I call “aggregated data”
probabilities πd , πm and πu . I call them aggregated because they are a weighted average of the corresponding sector-speciﬁc likelihood of non-compliance, truncating and
becoming unemployed. Because their goal is to compute aggregate data parameters,
they do not need to have a correctly speciﬁed form for the conditional probability of
the sector given the wage.
The identiﬁcation of the simpliﬁed version of the model here uses Doyle’s estimate
as a ﬁrst step. Then, the weights of the sector-speciﬁc probabilities are estimated,
and ﬁnally, one can solve for the sector-speciﬁc parameters. This is a worthwhile
exercise because, as I have shown above, a broader set of counterfactuals, such as
labor tax and the size of the formal sector, analyses can be performed with sector(1)

speciﬁc parameters. Moreover, πd is a parameter with more economic meaning than
πd itself.
Importantly, misspeciﬁcation of either sector-speciﬁc assumptions or the form of
the joint distribution of sector and wages has diﬀerent consequences for the aggre18

For example, if the left limit of the latent density of wages is 10% smaller than the right limit
and πd is equal to 0.2, then the estimated probability limit of the estimator of πd based on this
identiﬁcation strategy will be 0.18, only 2 percentage points smaller than the true value.
19
The only additional assumption needed for that identifying this parameter is a lack of spillovers
on sector probabilities. See the section on identiﬁcation of the restricted version of the model.
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gate parameters when compared to the sector-speciﬁc parameters. Two cases can
illustrate this: If either (a) unemployment eﬀects on the informal sector are present,
which is ruled out by Assumption 4, or (b) the model for the conditional probability of the sector given the wages is incorrectly speciﬁed, then the sector-speciﬁc
parameter estimators will be inconsistent. However, the aggregate ones will not be.
It is straightforward to see this because neither Doyle or Meyer and Wise use this
information.
The results concerning the misspeciﬁcation of the minimum wage eﬀects, the joint
distribution of latent sector and wages, spillovers or unknown heterogeneity of parameters point in the same direction. They show that the quantities obtained by the
identiﬁcation of the baseline model remain informative when some of the model’s
assumptions are incorrectly speciﬁed.

E.5.

Robust Estimates of the Eﬀects of the Minimum Wage on the Size of the
Informal Sector

This paper develops a model that allows one to estimate the eﬀects of the minimum
wage on a broad range of policy-relevant outcomes. Importantly, the model captures
a channel through which workers move from the formal sector to the informal sector
in response to the minimum wage policy. The eﬀects of the minimum wage on the size
of the informal sector have important policy implications. This parameter is key to
understand the eﬀects of the minimum wage on the government budget, for example.
Under the assumptions of the model, this parameter, the eﬀect of the minimum wage
on the size of the informal sector, can be consistently estimated. This section discuss
the extent to which those estimates are robust to deviations from these assumptions,
in particular the absence of spillovers. This will be achieved using Assumption 5, the
independence between latent sector and wages. The object of interest is

P r[S(1)=1]
,
P r[S(0)=1]

that is, the ratio of the size of the formal sector in the presence of the minimum wage
versus its size in the absence of the minimum wage. The numerator of this fraction
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can be directly estimated from the data. The counterfactual object is the latent size
of the informal sector. Under independence between latent sector and wages, we have:
P r[S(0) = 1] = P r[S(0) = 1|W (0) > m] = P r[S(1) = 1|W (1) > m].

This expression uses the size of the formal sector above the minimum wage as
the estimate of the latent size of the formal sector in the absence of the policy.
Interestingly, this result does not rely on the continuity of the latent wage distribution
or the correctness of the speciﬁcation of the minimum wage eﬀects on the bottom
part of the wage distribution. It relies on the independence, the lack of spillovers
assumptions, and P r[W (1) > m|W (0) < m] = 0. To evaluate the robustness of this
estimate to departures from the absence of spillovers, one simply needs to specify
a limit at which the spillovers should vanish. In the most extreme version of this
assumption, the eﬀects of the minimum wage vanish at the minimum wage level.
However, one can specify that the minimum wage eﬀects vanish at twice, or in general,
k-times the minimum wage level. This lead to the following identiﬁcation equation:
P r[S(0) = 1] = P r[S(0) = 1|W (0) > km] = P r[S(1) = 1|W (1) > km],
where k is a number greater than or equal to one. The ﬁrst equality follows from
independence between sector and wages, whereas the second follows from the absence
of spillovers at points higher than km.20 Table I reports the eﬀects of the minimum
wage on the size of the formal sector based on diﬀerent assumptions concerning where
spillovers should vanish. The baseline estimates are approximately 10%. The estimates
robust to spillovers ﬁnd an eﬀect of around 12 to 16%. The point estimates are significantly diﬀerent. The qualitative conclusions, however, remain similar. The minimum
20

It is interesting to note that one can also add spillovers on wages above this threshold. The only
restriction that needs to be imposed for this identiﬁcation to be eﬀective is the absence of spillovers
on sector probabilities. That is, workers do not move across in response to the minimum wage if
their latent wages are above km and P r[W (1) > km|W (0) < km] = 0.
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TABLE I
Robust Estimates of the Effects of the Minimum Wage on the Size of the Formal
Sector

W>2m

W>3m

2001 0.867*** 0.853***
(0.002)

(0.003)

2002 0.853*** 0.844***
(0.003)

(0.004)

2003 0.865*** 0.849***
(0.003)

(0.004)

2004 0.847*** 0.845***
(0.003)

(0.003)

2005 0.860*** 0.866***
(0.003)

(0.004)

2006 0.858*** 0.850***
(0.003)

(0.004)

2007 0.879*** 0.872***
(0.002)

(0.004)

2008 0.873*** 0.873***
(0.002)

(0.003)

2009 0.883*** 0.878***
(0.002)

(0.003)

wage has a sizable impact on the size of the formal sector. This section shows that
those eﬀects should be further magniﬁed if spillovers are indeed present. These results
are based on the minimal assumptions of independence and lack of spillovers in the
upper part of the wage distribution. They are robust to limited spillovers, a lack of
continuity in the latent wage distribution and misspeciﬁcation of the minimum wage
eﬀects on the lower part of the wage distribution.
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TABLE II
Labor Tax effects under a “No Unemployment” assumption

APPENDIX F: TAX EFFECTS OF THE MINIMUM WAGE UNDER ALTERNATIVE
ASSUMPTIONS

To provide an idea of the importance of the unemployment eﬀects on the matter
at hand, I will also compute the eﬀects of the minimum wage on taxes based on a
diﬀerent model. In this version, I will force the unemployment eﬀects to be equal
to zero. By doing so, I no longer need to assume the continuity of the latent wage
distribution. Formally, the model operates as follows. I will retain Assumptions 6
(independence) and 3 (no spillovers). Assumption 4 will be modiﬁed to force πu = 0:
Assumption 4

No Unemployment Eﬀects

Under the minimum wage, a fraction πd of workers will earn the same wage as in
the latent wage distribution. The remaining fraction will earn the minimum wage.
These fractions can be sector-speciﬁc as in the baseline model. Note that there is no
Assumption 1 (continuity) in this case. Under these assumptions, the observed wage
density will relate to the latent density by the following equation:

f (w) =

⎧
⎪
⎪
⎪
⎨
⎪
⎪
⎪
⎩

πd f0 (w)

if w < m

(1 − πd )F0 (m) if w = m
f0 (w)

if w > m,

where f0 (w) is the latent wage distribution based on this diﬀerent set of assumptions. In this case, we only need to estimate πd . One way to do so is by recognizing
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that in this case:
πd =

P r[W < m]
.
P r[W < m] + P r[W = m]

Therefore, a consistent estimator can be constructed by plugging in the maximum
likelihood estimator of the respective quantity. With an estimate of πd , the latent
wage density can be easily estimated by properly reweighting the observed wage
density. Then, the tax eﬀects of the minimum wage can be computed under the “no
unemployment” assumption, given by:

R≡

T (1)
P r[S(1) = 1] E(τ (W (1))W (1)|S(1) = 1)
=
·
.
T (0)
P r[S(0) = 1] E(τ (W (0))W (0)|S(0) = 1)

This is exactly the same expression as before without the unemployment component
c. Importantly, the expected wages under the latent distribution also change, as the
estimate of the latent distribution is diﬀerent under this diﬀerent set of assumptions.
Table II reports the estimates of R for the years from 2001 to 2009. The estimates
under the assumption of no-unemployment indicate that the minimum wage has a
suﬃciently strong eﬀect on average wages to compensate for the reduction in the
share of the formal sector due to sector transition. Moreover, note that the for the
same data, the implied eﬀect of the minimum wage on the average wages of those
employed is, as expected, smaller when one assumes the absence of unemployment
eﬀects.

